NEW DELHI, Aug. 13 — Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko was hack in Moscow today after having resurrected Indian morale and burying, in the view of most observers, India's cherished policy of nonalignment.

The Indian public, which had been angry and despondent over Chinese and American assistance to Pakistan at a time when Pakistan is talking of war with India, has been taken out of its doldrums by the 20‐year friendship treaty with the Soviet Union signed here Monday.

The treaty — which gives India what she so badly wanted, a major‐power ally in the confrontation with Pakistan — says that the two countries will hold “mutual consultations” and “take appropriate effective measures” in the event of an attack or threat against either country by a third country.

Yet even amid the initial Indian elation, questions are being raised in the press and among informed Indians about the wisdom of the treaty.

Some observers are asking whether, by signing this treaty, India has lost much of her maneuverability in foreign policy and taken a step toward becoming an unofficial Soviet ally.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and other officials insist that the treaty is not a departure from nonalignment, but merely an independent move in the national interest and that it, in fact, strengthens nonalignment.

If so, critics say, then nonalignment — a policy conceived by Mrs. Gandhi's late father, Jawaharlal Nehru, in the nineteen‐fifties and adopted by much of the African‐Asian third world — will have to he redefined. For in the Nehru view, nonalignment meant no military alliances and no mutual defense pacts — and this treaty is viewed by most observers as a defense pact.

However, Indian officials, with the same vehemence they use in insisting that nonalignment is alive, contend that the Indian‐Soviet pact is not a defense treaty, though in the same breath they say that the Russians have promised to provide essential military supplies — arms, spare parts, oil —should Pakistan attack.

One member of Parliament hailed the new “realism” in India's policy, and praised Mrs. Gandhi for having “put some meat in our vegetarian nonalignment.” Another member said: “At a time when international relations are being forged for naked self‐interest, it is absurd to talk of ideals.”

The impetus for putting some “meat” in Indian policy comes from the crisis in East Pakistan, which began March 25 when the Pakistani army launched military offensive to try to crush the Bengali separatist movement there.

More than seven million Bengali refugees have fled into India to escape the military repression, and the influx continues, placing a severe burden on India's economy. India is providing military assistance to the Bengali independence fighters and clashes have occurred between Indian and Pakistani troops on the East Pakistani border.

Pakistan has been threatening to declare war if India continues her aid to the Bengali insurgents.

Communist China has been supporting Pakistan outright. The United States, while giving sizable help for the refugees, has continued arms shipments to Pakistan.

This American arms aid to India's enemy has aroused deep bitterness and a sense of betrayal here and has brought Indian‐American relations to an all‐time low. This situation, foreign diplomats believe, has made possible Moscow's diplomatic coup.

The anti‐American mood here was reflected in an editorial in The National Herald, the paper that most closely reflects Mrs. Gandhi's views. Lauding the Indian‐Soviet treaty, the editorial said:

“The policy‐makers and potential aggressors of the United States should know that they no longer have the initiative for creating trouble in this region. They have been warned and neutralized. Aggression and threat of aggression have received a setback and the Soviet Union has rendered a great service to peace in the region.”

Observers believe the Indian glow over the treaty may not wear off in a hurry. Nonetheless, some critics are already asking whether the treaty was really necessary, whether it was not a hastily conceived pact that the Indian Government grasped out of emotion and expediency and will regret later.

These critics argue that the Russians need India as much as India needs them, that Moscow was already New Delhi's closest ally and largest supplier of arms, and that should an Indian‐Pakistani war erupt, Soviet arms would continue to flow to India without a treaty.