To the Editor:

Thirty‐eight members of a United Nations team, according to Secretary General Thant, will be on the spot in East Pakistan by the end of August to administer humanitarian aid. This might sound like good news to Americans who have sympathized with the Bengalis since March 25, when the Pakistan Army began machine‐gunning civilians, destroying homes and food stocks, burning villages, and driving more than seven millions of men, women and children into exile.

To get a clearer idea of the relief activities which the United Nations proposes to carry out in East Bengal, it is worth rereading The Times dis patch from Washington on Aug. 1 under the byline of Benjamin Welles. “Qualified informants” explained to Mr. Welles that the “U.N. force” would concern itself primarily with “helping the Pakistani authorities” to ward off famine and disease, and to rehouse the millions who have become home less. Rather than operating in its own name, the U.N. will provide technical assistance and “help restore confidence in the East Pakistani administration.”

The “new force,” an official told Mr. Welles, is expected to “help Pakistan restore communications and re mobilize the province's private fleet of 40,000 river boats and 10,000 trucks.” It is precisely in cutting transport lines that the Bengali guerrillas have begun to score notable successes.

Striking from sanctuaries across the Indian border, from tiny “liberated” enclaves, from jungle fastnesses of the delta where the army has not been able to flush them out, Bengali sabotage squads have disrupted rail traffic, blown up road bridges, sunk river boats, blocked off channels, destroyed boat ‐ repair yards. Transport is the very life‐blood of the army's occupation of East Bengal. If the Bangla Desh Mukti Bahini (Bengal Liberation Army) can deny the West Pakistanis their lines of communication, they can eventually drive them out.

In plain English, then, the main job for which the United Nations group is being sent to East Bengal is not to succor the victimized Bengalis but rather to bolster up the shaky regime of the West Pakistani generals. The Pakistan Army has failed to bring the Bengalis to heel. The generals thought their military operation would take three days. That was more than four months ago. A strong injection of international aid represents perhaps the last chance for prolonging the grip of the ruling junta on East Bengal.

If it proves able to accomplish any thing at all, the U.N. mission may strengthen temporarily the logistical position of the Pakistan Army. In this case, the chances for restoring peace in East Bengal would be set back. No genuine relief and rehabilitation measures can be undertaken until the West Pakistan Army withdraws from East Bengal.

Alice Thorner
Paris, Aug. 16, 1971