Washington's urgent appeal to India and Pakistan to refrain from a conflict that has already begun erupt along the long Indo‐Pak borders is inadequate response to a perilous situation that Administration policy has helped to aggravate.

The recent decision to cut off further arms aid Pakistan was a small step toward reversing this disastrous policy of continuing material and moral support for the military regime in Islamabad. The arms aid, though modest in quantity, had put the United States in the unpardonable position of appearing to condone and even to abet President Yahya's vicious crackdown on the Bengalis of East Pakistan and their elected leaders.

The cut‐off suggests that the White House has at last begun to view seriously the repression in East Pakistan and its grave consequences for neighboring India, where more than nine million refugees already have fled. This evidence of change in an American attitude that has created deep resentment and fed frustration in India shouhd strengthen Prime Minister Gandhi in her efforts to restrain New Delhi's hawks.

But arms suspension alone falls far short of Mrs. Gandhi's expressed hope for “some wise impulse ... to save humanity from despair.” There is no apparent shortage of military equipment—or of potential military suppliers—to fuel the threatening conflict in South Asia. While the Indians have been pressing high‐level Soviet visitors for speedier arms deliveries with apparent success, a Pakistani delegation recently visited Peking, presumably on a similar mission.

What the subcontinent desperately needs is strong international pressure on Islamabad to reach a political settlement in the rebellious eastern province—a settlement that will facilitate the speedy repatriation of the refugees, now threatening India's economic, social and political stability. Such a genuine political solution within Pakistan would greatly lessen the threat of war.

The United States could help by exercising its influence in Islamabad more vigorously on behalf of an accommodation between President Yahya Khan and the imprisoned Sheik Mujibur Rahman and his outlawed Awami League. But India could ease the task of American and other would‐be peacemakers by urging moderation on the Bangla Desh leadership, which is heavily dependent Indian support. Concessions from President Yahya might come if the Awami leaders abandoned their recent demand for total independence in favor of the substantial autonomy for which they campaigned last December.

It will take “some wise impulses” on both sides to save the long‐suffering humanity of the subcontinent from a new disaster in the critical weeks ahead.