A NEWSPAPER columnist in New Delhi predicted that an
Indo-Pakistan war would start on November 20 soon after
the 40-day Moslem fast of Ramadan ends; obviously no
army fights on an empty stomach. But time was not lost
during the holy fast by PPP (Pakistan People's Party)
leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. His pilgrimage took him to
Peking, not to wash away sins but to strengthen the
sinews of war - or at least the promises behind them.
For weeks Indians have been asking themselves when- not
if - war will be upon them. Civil defence measures and
blackout trials have added to the sense of urgency. But
with the end of Ramadan, tension declined markedly -
largely due to Premier Indira Gandhi's Western tour.

It is conceded that Mrs. Gandhi failed to bring about an
appreciable change in official US attitudes, but she
created a powerful impression and it is felt that
whatever the official reactions, public opinion abroad
at least is much better informed of the Indian stand. A
London Times editorial on the eve of her visit to
Britain said that India's links with the Bangla Desh
guerillas were understandable and perhaps even
inevitable.

Nor was the irony lost on Washington reporters when Mrs.
Gandhi commented that the US Senate decision to cut off
foreign aid was an internal problem of the US affecting
many nations. She projected forcefully India's
impatience with international myopia regarding Bangla
Desh.

But for a solution of the refugee problem, India must
rely on the success of the Mukti Bahini (liberation
forces)-unless President Yahya Khan's regime starts to
negotiate a settlement with the imprisoned leader of the
Awami League, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. India may be wrong
to assume the Mukti Bahini's activities can permit the
refugees to return in the next few months. Many believe
there will be prolonged turmoil and fighting in East
Pakistan before Islamabad realises the futility of
trying to keep 70 million people under the jackboot.

But each move by the Pakistan army in the eastern wing
is yielding fewer returns. Collective penalties do not
ensure obedience; and there are too few troops to cover
the whole area. Until last month, the army's four or
five divisions were deployed over strategic areas and
communications centres. This left the border with India
open, enabling the millions of refugees to cross
comparatively safely-and admirers in India to send
sizable supplies to the freedom fighters. When the army,
realising the border must be sealed, redeployed the
troops along it, the Mukti Bahini was able to step up
its campaign within Bangla Desh and seize control of
large parts of the Sylhet, Mymensingh and Khustia
districts.

Unless Islamabad can transport several more divisions to
the eastern wing - and supply them - the Mukti Bahini
cannot be crushed. And its resources are not
diminishing: this month it claimed it had obtained
helicopters from abroad and was in the process of
forming the nucleus of an airforce. The Bengalis were
well represented in the Pakistan navy- being, unlike the
Punjabis, seafarers. Trained Bengali naval personnel
have deserted en masse and the Mukti Bahini, though it
has no ships, can call on these men to harass shipping
in East Bengal's two principal ports, Chittagong and
Chalna.

About 16 naval supply vessels have been damaged or sunk
so far, including some flying Greek, American or Turkish
flags. Shipping lines have been faced with 100%
increases in insurance charges on cargoes and vessels
bound for East Bengal; they have passed on the cost or
refused to unload there at all. At Karachi itself cargo
intended for the eastern wing have been stranded for
lack of berthing and handling facilities at Chittagong.
Islamabad's biggest headache-the maintenance of supplies
- will get worse as the army is further harassed. Most
of the 50,000 men of the East Pakistan Rifles and the
police are believed to have escaped the March massacre;
they have trained thousands more in the use of arms,
sabotage and ambush techniques. At least 100,000
volunteers are under training.

The Pakistan government also has to contend with
discontent among the troops and police sent from the
west to East Bengal. Dispatched at short notice, they
expected it to be a jaunt lasting a couple of weeks. As
the months went by and an undisclosed number of their
comrades were shipped back in ill-made coffins, rations
ran short and even munitions were less than plentiful,
they wanted to go home. Now they won't be back for the
Id festival marking the end of Ramadan or for Christmas
either. They are ignorant of the Bengali language and
surrounded by a hostile population. The heroes of the
spring massacres are demoralised.

New Delhi hopes that in a few months large chunks of
territory contiguous with the Indian border will be
under Mukti Bahini control, enabling the refugees to
begin their return journey. When they do go "home,"
things will get worse for the army.

Meanwhile India has taken the Chinese statements on the
occasion of Bhutto's Peking visit calmly. New Delhi is
aware that Bhutto has been the principal architect of
the Peking-Islamabad axis. But at home, Bhutto is a
frustrated man; that the military regime sought to use
him says less about Peking's anxiety to keep faith with
an old friend than about Islamabad's need for a stunt to
boost morale. Yahya can now tell his people that China's
steadfastness balances Soviet friendship for India.

America, China and the Soviet Union tend to talk the
same language: the need for peace in the subcontinent,
the desirability of bilateral talks; they-all favour a
political solution to Bangla Desh, not a military one.
After claiming that East Bengal is an internal problem
of Pakistan, Yahya has been trying hard to make it an
international issue, putting India in the dock. He
appears to have failed. And it is this failure that may
still start a shooting war.

The Indian assessment is that Pakistan may aim thus to
bring about big power or UN intervention as in 1965 -
another Tashkent, where the Bengalis will be lectured on
the need to support the integrity of the Pakistani
nation. Since independence India has fought three times:
twice with Pakistan, in 1948 and 1965, and once with
China in 1962. On all three occasions it was unprepared.
Today the situation is different. Both the armed forces
and the people are fully prepared for the worst.

Trial blackouts have been failures before: the October
and November trials were total successes. Postal and
telegraph employees have volunteered to work one hour
extra every day to expedite all communications. Ordnance
factories are working to maximum capacity and labour
disputes have been put in cold storage. Villagers are
patrolling railway tracks round the clock to prevent
sabotage. Everywhere there is an awareness that the
nation is threatened and of the individual's duty and
responsibility. On the eve of Mrs. Gandhi's tour abroad,
all opposition party leaders called on her to pledge
their unstinted support in the event of an emergency.

Military leaders and politicians both say India will not
repeat the mistakes of 1965 when action was not decisive
enough. Now they talk of dealing Pakistan a blow it will
remember for generations. The Himalayan passes and
heights are largely snowbound. India has withdrawn part
of the 10 mountain divisions guarding the northern and
northeastern frontier. They army's striking power has
been considerably enhanced with new weapons. General
Harbaksh Singh, former head of the Western Command,
claims it could take the Indian army three to four weeks
to overcome all resistance in East Bengal in the event
of war. It would depend, he added, on the amount of
force India was willing to employ: it would be well
advised to wield a hammer to swat a fly.

There are no doubt hawks and doves in the Indian Foreign
Ministry. But the chances of an unwanted war through
some hasty action by hawks here still are far less than
those of similar action by the hawks in Islamabad.