1971-12-08
By Spartak Beglov
Page: 0
Reprinted in the Soviet Review, January 18, 1972
THE discussion on the Indo-Pakistani conflict at the UN Security Council has graphically demonstrated the different ways in which it is possible to evaluate one and the same event. The sponsors of several resolutions regarded the current Indo-Pak war as an ordinary conflict when they talked of ceasefire and withdrawal of forces.
Though tanks and aircraft operate on either side of the border, the central feature of the situation is that the real seat of conflict and the chief line of confrontation runs inside Pakistan.
The tragedy of the Indian subcontinent has had several acts.
The first act was enacted twenty-five years ago on the script of the British colonialists who did all they could to build the pattern of independence for India and Pakistan on the principle of "divide and rule". The 1965 war was one of the links in the chain of that bloody scenario.
The second act inevitably flowed from the ethnic and economic contradictions inherent in the structure of Pakistan with its two wings. I had the occasion to attend in March 1966 a meeting of the Pakistan National Assembly held, as an exception, in East Pakistan's capital, Dacca. An outside observer could not but be struck by the very first clash between the two wings over a purely procedural issue—which language was to he used for the debate. The West Pakistanis speak Urdu and do not understand the Bengali language of East Pakistan. But the East Pakistanis demanded that, since the meeting was being held in their territory, Bengali should be the first official language. A compromise was reached only after turning to the heritage left by the former colonialists. It was agreed to consider English a "third official" language.
But passions flared up especially when it came to the gist of the matter: distribution of financial and other resources between the two parts of Pakistan. The East Pakistanis with their small industry and flood- and drought-afflicted primitive agriculture were demanding at least an equal share for themselves. The West Pakistanis, on the other hand, tried to steer the debate into arousing passions against the "sworn enemy"—India. The East Pakistanis demanded their due—justice for themselves and for the land they were born in. That was how five years ago the contradiction was put up nakedly and in sharp relief. It was already clear then that neither artificially whipped up bellicose moods towards the "external enemy", nor tightened military control within the country would offer good prospects for Pakistan and for peace in that area.
The elections of 1970 held out hope for the East Pakistanis. Their party—the Awami League—led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman won most of the seats in the Pakistan Assembly, and the East Pakistanis thought that due regard would be shown for their interests. But the hope was dashed by the "massacre of St. Bartholomew" of East Pakistan. By the end of March 1971, repression had been let loose against hundreds of thousands of people.
Over ten million East Pakistanis crossed the Indian frontier to save their lives. That was not a mere flow of refugees. The eruption of the East Pakistani volcano became for India an event which drastically upset the balance of its domestic economy, affecting its security in the widest sense of the word and the outcome of all its political campaigns at home. Yet the ever more threatening statements from the Pakistani capital made increasingly clear the intention of those who had suppressed the East Pakistanis to extinguish the flames of internal conflagration by rousing war-like passions against India.
And when they speak of "mutual troop withdrawals" and "ceasefire" as the sole means of putting down the flames of war, they forget that the hotbed of war cannot be extinguished without a simultaneous settlement in East Pakistan with account taken of the will expressed by its people.
Thus the keys to peace and security in the entire Indian subcontinent are first of all in the hands of the Pakistani authorities. They have taken away justice from a whole people, deciding that the sword would be the best substitute. It is not too late to restore justice, and then the sword will have nothing to do but return to its sheath.
The Soviet Union has always wanted the Indian subcontinent to be a subcontinent of peace and that the efforts of its peoples should be devoted entirely to the tackling of problems of their economic and social development. Faced with today's armed conflict, the Soviet Union comes out for an early halt to the bloodshed and for a political settlement in East Pakistan on the basis of respect for the legitimate rights and interests of its people.
(December 8, 1971)