THE UN Security Council failed to arrive at a decision which would speed up the normalisation of the situation in the Indian subcontinent. This was not because of a dearth of draft resolutions. There were too many of them. The main thing was that the majority of the draft resolutions did not solve the basic problem—that of removing the causes of the crisis—and, therefore, could not contribute effectively to the normalisation of the situation.
The outwardly attractive calls for the ending of military operations between India and Pakistan and for the withdrawal of armed forces to the territories of their states figured in the US draft backed by the delegation of the People's Republic of China, in the Italian-Belgian draft supported by Japan, and in the draft of eight non-permanent members of the Security Council.
Crux of the Problem
But does this cessation of military actions between India and Pakistan mean the cessation of bloodshed in the Indian subcontinent? Not at all. There were no hostilities between India and Pakistan in April, May, June and so on till December. But the blood in East Pakistan flowed freely. Many thousands of East Pakistanis died, while some 10 million had to flee to India because of the mass terror and lawlessness in East Pakistan. To limit oneself to the call for "early", "immediate" cessation of military operations is tantamount to dooming many more thousands of East Pakistanis to death and many more millions to become refugees from their native land.
Consequently, what is important is not only the ending of military actions, but the immediate cessation of the bloodshed, as suggested in the draft resolution of the Soviet Union which was vetoed by the delegation of the People's Republic of China.
The US draft resolution provided for stationing of UN military observers on the Indo-Pakistani frontier. What would such a step entail? No less and no more than granting the Pakistani Military Administration an opportunity to continue with impunity its terror against its political opponents—the overwhelming majority of the East Pakistani inhabitants. Their condition would worsen a hundred times as compared with what existed earlier. An additional obstacle would arise to the saving of people by crossing the border. The UN Security Council would thus have become a shield for the terrorist actions of the Pakistani authorities.
Outrage on Freedom-Loving People
As is known, during the parliamentary elections to the National Assembly in December 1970 it was precisely the overwhelming majority of the population of East Pakistan which displayed political trust in the Awami League standing for autonomy for East Pakistan within the framework of a single state, for the carrying out of democratic reforms in that province, and Pakistan's withdrawal from aggressive blocs. East Pakistan's population unanimously supported the candidates of the Awami League. But instead of solving the problems that had arisen by political means on a democratic basis, the Government of Pakistan, on March 25, 1971, banned the Awami League, annulled the parliamentary mandates of the League members and arrested its leaders, Mujibur Rahman and others, starting a secret trial against the former. But the Government of Pakistan did not limit itself to this. It decided to deal harshly with the population of East Pakistan, which had voted for the League's candidates, entrusting this black deed to the armed forces and special paramilitary detachments of the fanatical "Razakars". This outrage continues to this day.
Can the fate of 10 million refugees be decided in the existing conditions by platonically offering "to create a climate favourable to the voluntary return of the refugees to East Pakistan" (US draft) or "to step up efforts to create conditions necessary for the quick and voluntary return of millions of refugees to their homes" (the Italian-Belgian draft)? The answer is obvious.
Ceasefire With Political Settlement
Struggling for the establishment of peace in the Indian subcontinent, the Soviet delegation put before the Security Council a draft resolution which took account of the wishes of a number of delegations. The Soviet draft proposed "Calling on all interested countries as a first step to effect an immediate ceasefire and to end all military operations and also to urge the Pakistani Government to simultaneously take effective measures for a political settlement in East Pakitan, immediately recognising the expressed will of the East Pakistani population, as it was expressed in the elections of December 1970." The draft stresses the inseparable connection between the problem of ceasefire and a political settlement in East Pakistan.
Trying to obstruct the adoption of a resolution aimed at a just solution of the problem, some delegations proposed that the discussion on the question in the Security Council should be postponed and that it should be taken to the plenary meetings of the UN General Assembly. This proposal was supported by the majority of the delegations.
The future will show which measures will be finally adopted by the UN. But if genuine concern is to be shown for peace in the Indian subcontinent, then the chief thing lies in the immediate cessation of the bloodshed and an immediate political settlement in East Pakistan on the basis of respect for the legitimate rights and interests of its people. This is what is advocated by the Soviet Union.
(APN, December 10, 1971)