Baltimore Sun

Elegantly dressed and sitting in a suite in the Hotel Belmont Plaza in New York, Sayyid Karim and M. R. Siddiqui do not look like two of the leaders of the Bangla Desh guerrilla struggle in East Pakistan, but the substance of their words belies their appearance.
"We can't say exactly when, but by next month we should be facing the enemy man-to-man," said Mr. Siddiqui, a quiet-spoken man whom Mr. Karim had introduced as "the man who will be our ambassador to the United States."
The mission, which is in New York to conduct lobbying activities at the United Nations and to maintain contacts with relief organizations, consists of eight elected representatives of the Bangla Desh government, two former ambassadors and two ex-university presidents.
Mr. Siddiqui's remark confirmed recent reports that the Mukti Bahini, the guerrilla organization of the Bangla Desh movement, will dramatically intensify their activities in the next few weeks.
Their great fear is that these plans will be upset by an open war breaking out between India and Pakistan.
"We don't think India plans to go to war," Mr. Siddiqui said. "But the Pakistan government's propaganda about border activities may be meant to justify going to war.
"We are afraid that Pakistan might start a war in order to convert this situation into an international issue. That would be a setback for us."
Contrary to some press reports, the Bangla Desh representatives insist that they are neither being equipped by the Indian government nor using Indian territory as a sanctuary.
"We originally had three sources of military equipment," said Mr. Karim, who was the No. 2 man at the U.N. for the Pakistan government until he resigned. "First, we obtained equipment from Bengali units in the Pakistan Army; second, from the border guards called the East Pakistan Rifles, and third, from the police force. Since then, we have developed contacts with gun-runners and clandestine foreign sources."
Money has not been a problem, they report.
"We have obtained a significant amount of money by auctioning or selling jute and tea in Calcutta and Agartala" [a part of India located east of East Pakistan]," Mr. Karim said. "And the bulk of the money taken from banks in East Pakistan before the military repression has been changed on the black market in Hong Kong and Beirut before the money was de-monetized."
The guerrillas in East Pakistan are faced with what Mr. Siddiqui admits is an irreconcilable problem: disruption, a key element in guerrilla strategy, causes great human suffering and could undermine popular support. A dramatic case in point was the recent revelation that the guerrillas have sabotaged a number of relief ships in East Pakistani ports.
"We will not sabotage a relief ship," said Mr. Karim, "but how can you tell a relief ship from a ship carrying food for the Pakistan Army?
"We want relief ships to fly the United Nations flag and to be clearly marked so that our guerrillas can be informed ahead of time. If a ship is carrying both guns and food, however, it is fair game."
"We also want foreign aid to be administered directly by the foreign agency, so that relief operations will not be used to the advantage of the Pakistan Army. At present the Pakistanis have not allowed a single relief agency to operate in East Pakistan, except for the very limited supervisory role being played by the U.N."
Continued speculation about the reason for the breakdown in the March negotiations between Yahya Khan, military leader of Pakistan, and East Pakistani leader Mujibur Rahman is contradicted sharply by the Bangladesh representatives, who maintain that the negotiations did not break down at all but were successfully completed.
"We think a substantive agreement between Mujib and Yahya was made but was not announced," said Mr. Siddiqui. "But it was of no value because a firm decision to crack down militarily had already been made by the West Pakistani leaders prior to the negotiations. Troops were coming by plane and by boat before the negotiations ever began."
The demand for outright secession, they maintain, came about only after the military response, not before, as the West Pakistanis claim.
"Since March we have gone far beyond Mujib's original demand for autonomy," said Mr. Siddiqui. "There can't be a political settlement now; we want nothing short of independence."
Both men reject the idea that there is any immediate danger of the liberation movement shifting to the left politically.
"If it drags on too long, there is a possibility the movement will shift to the left," said Mr. Siddiqui. "But for the short run—six months to two years—there is no chance of that.
Though in prison in West Pakistan, Sheik Mujib remains firmly in control of the movement, they say.
"We hope that the international community will put as much pressure as possible on the Pakistan government for the release of Mujib," said Mr. Karim.
Mindful of the continued flow of refugees into India, part of the Bangla Desh platform is a pledge to return their lands to any refugees who come back.
"Their land will never be returned to them by the present government," said Mr. Siddiqui.
On the whole both men are confident of victory.
"We are optimistic," said Mr. Karim, "but we are concerned about the misery. The only answer is to end the struggle quickly."
Ending the struggle quickly may indeed be the only answer for the Bangla Desh movement is in a race against the refugees.
If the tactics of disruption arc successful, and if as predicted famine becomes prevalent during the next few months, the number of refugees fleeing to India cannot be expected to decline.
How long India can absorb 30,000 or more refugees a day is a matter for conjecture, but it is certainly a matter of months, not of years.
Thus it may become a question of which comes first; an outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan as the result of an intolerable refugee problem, or the success of the guerrilla movement in wresting the government of East Pakistan away from its present occupants.