WASHINGTON.—Prime Minister Indira Gandhi comes here beleaguered and looking for help.
In her homeland she fights off rising Indian resentment over the burden of 9,500,000 refugees (by Indian estimates) from East Pakistan.
Here on a three-day visit, Mrs. Gandhi encounters Washington Officials who see as much need for equitable relations with Pakistan as with India.
United States attitudes toward India's plight are also conditioned by U.S. relations with Peking and Moscow and hoped-for big-power détentes.
The surface temptation for all three powers is to maneuver for advantage in Southeast Asia, but there is evident restraint by all three thus far.
How can Mrs. Gandhi get her message across to Mr. Nixon and the American people that Pakistan is the cause of the present turmoil and that demands for concessions should be made upon Pakistan, not India?
The welcome on the White House lawn was cordial and fitting for a woman who has survived the cliques of male politicians in the world's largest democracy.
U.S.-Indian relations, however, have seen better days. Mrs. Gandhi couldn't resist tweaking Washington for a "short-term view" even while en route here via Great Britain.
Realistically, the Indians do not expect to convert Mr. Nixon to their cause. What they do hope for is a few more supporters in Congress to put pressure on the White House.
Mrs. Gandhi is not looking for referees between Pakistan and India. How does one compromise between justice and injustice, she asks sternly.
A condemnation of the Pakistan central government in West Pakistan for a rule of terror in the separated East Pakistan is demanded by Mrs. Gandhi. Economic sanctions and complete cutoffs of military aid are urgently asked.
In the past the U.S. has generally seen itself as a warm sympathizer with India—in thought and deed—dating back to India's struggle for independence from Great Britain.

VIETNAM INVOLVED

American heads of state have been irritated on occasion by what they regard as a holier-than-thou attitude on the part of India. In recent times this has centered on India's opposition to the U.S. role in South Vietnam.
In Pakistan, the U.S. has also found a kind of stability and friendship, though Pakistan admittedly has confusing triangular relations with Moscow, Peking, and Washington.
It seems from the Indian side, that wealthy Washington likes only "yes men" and prefers the company of military governments to those of democracies.
Whatever the merits of these contentions, the crushing of the East Pakistan independence movement in March by armed forces directed from West Pakistan severely accentuated differences.
The U.S. and other countries sent relief supplies and assistance. Fine, said India, but this is only a temporary palliative.

PARTY LEADER HELD

Why shouldn't the U.S. concentrate on persuading President Yahya Khan of Pakistan to recognize the legitimate grievances of East Pakistanis and permit a normal political evolution?
For President Yahya, who views the whole matter as internal and as an Indian-inspired grab for East Pakistan victory or hegemony, this is nonsense.
The West Pakistan Government continues to hold Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, leader of the East Pakistan majority political party, the Awami League.
Should steps be taken to release him, it is possible that the atmosphere would moderate. But Pakistan, like India, is not about to give up anything without some very solid guarantees of substance in return.
Almost everyone agrees that the success or failure of guerrilla forces in East Pakistan in the next few weeks or months could be a most influential factor for peace or war.
The Pakistan Government could be backed to the wall and it could accept its fate and give in to rebel demands or it could strike out boldly at India, charging aggression.

INVASION VS. WAITING GAME

India could, rather than see the East Pakistan rebels defeated, invade East Pakistan, or it could continue to play a waiting game. India threatens action, but Washington isn't positive what will happen
The U.S., for its part, did respond after the March upset in East Pakistan by stopping military aid—except for that already contracted for and in the pipeline at that time.
It is no small matter for the U.S. that Pakistan openly boasts that Communist China will aid it with military supplies if necessary.
The recent Indian pact with Moscow may tend to balance this off. But in both instances the U.S. is not anxious to test the present big power balance in South Asia.

UN OBSERVERS UNWELCOME

India has steadfastly rebuffed suggestions that United Nations representatives be stationed on both sides of the East Pakistan and Indian borders. The argument is that the trouble is wholly caused by the Pakistani Government.
The reality of the military situation is that India does hold the upper handsome 930,000 in India's armed forces, as compared to Pakistan's 324,500.
India is training some of the refugees for guerrilla warfare in East Pakistan. Pakistan claims that Indian forces have themselves crossed the border as it suited their purposes.
Behind the scenes, and particularly in talks with Mrs. Gandhi, U.S. diplomats urge restraint. But, like Mrs. Gandhi, they are not at all certain what the mutually acceptable path to peace will be.