Library of Congress - Kissinger Papers

Washington, September 8, 1972

Department of State

TELEGRAM

R 081314Z SEP 72

FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5966

INFO AMEMBASSY DACCA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

USMISSIONUSUN NEW YORK

AMCONSUL KARACHI

AMCONSUL LAHORE

SECTION 1 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 7547

EXDIS

SUBJECT:
CONVERSATION WITH PRES BHUTTO: PART I-THE SUBCONTINENT

1. SUMMARY: BHUTTO EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT AT HIS INABILITY TO PROCEED WITH RECOGNITION OF BD IN AUGUST AS EARLIER PLANNED, AS RESULT MUJIB’S REFUSAL TO MEET HIM AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL OPPOSITION. HE REAFFIRMED INTENTION TO MOVE TOWARD BD RECOGNITION AS SOON AS CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT. ALSO REAFFIRMED INTENTION TO CONTINUE EFFORTS TOWARD RAPPROCHMENT WITH INDIA PER SIMLA AGREEMENT. ALTHOUGH TIMETABLE HAS BEEN SET BACK SOMEWHAT. HE IS QUITE AWARE OF RELEVANCE OF GOP RECOGNITION OF BD TO CONTINUED PROGRESS WITH INDIA. BHUTTO INDICATED HE HAD TAKEN INITIATIVE ON CHINESE VETO OF BD APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO UN. HE DID NOT THINK POSITION WOULD BE CHANGED IN TIME TO PERMIT ADMISSION BY THIS YEAR’S UNGA. END SUMMARY
2. PRES BHUTTO INVITED ME FOR DINNER SEPT 7 AT HIS RAWALPINDI RESIDENCE. DURING A THREE-HOUR PERIOD, WITH NO OTHERS PRESENT, WE TOUCHED ON A VARIETY OF CURRENT ISSUES SPICED BY BHUTTO’S REMINISCENCES FROM HIS YEARS OF INVOLVEMENT IN PAK AFFAIRS AT HIGH LEVEL. BHUTTO SEEMED RELAXED AND REASONABLY WELL RESTED DESPITE HECTIC PACE WHICH HE HAS BEEN MAINTAINING. THIS MESSAGE COVERS HIGHLIGHTS OF OUR CONVERSATION ON RELATIONS WITH BANGLADESH (BD) AND INDIA AND THE CHINESE CONNECTION. OTHER PRINCIPAL SUBJECTS COVERED DURING THE EVENING BEING REPORTED SEPTELS.
3. BHUTTO ACKNOWLEDGED THERE WAS SETBACK TO TIMETABLE HE HAD ENVISAGED IN NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH BANGLADESH AND INDIA. HE HAD NOT FOUND IT POSSIBLE TO PROCEED AS HE HAD HOPED TO PUT BD RECOGNITION BEFORE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WHEN IT CONVENED IN MID AUGUST AS HE HAD EARLIER TOLD ME, HIS DOMESTIC OPPONENTS HAD TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO BELABOR HIM AS GETTING READY TO SELL EAST PAKISTAN DOWN THE RIVER. MEANWHILE, HE WAS VULNERABLE BECAUSE MUJIB HAD STUBBORNLY CONTINUED TO REJECT ANY MEETING WITH BHUTTO WITHOUT PRIOR FORMAL RECOGNITION OF BD BY GOP. I SAID I THOUGHT BHUTTO HAD DECIDED BEFORE HE WENT TO SIMLA IN LATE JUNE, THAT HE WOULD MOVE AHEAD ON BD RECOGNITION IN AUGUST EVEN IF HE COULD NOT MEET MUJIB BEFOREHAND. BHUTTO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE HAD BEEN THINKING ALONG THOSE LINES, ALTHOUGH HE HAD BEEN GIVEN REASON TO BELIEVE (ESPECIALLY BY INDONESIANS) THAT MEETING WITH MUJIB WOULD BE ARRANGED FOR JULY. IN ABSENCE SUCH MEETING AND IN LIGHT OF POLITICAL ATTACKS ON HIM ESPECIALLY IN PUNJAB, BHUTTO HAD DECIDED TO MAKE TACTICAL RETREAT.
4. BHUTTO SAID HE HAD PERCEIVED NO CHANGE IN MUJIB’S POSITION WHEN HE TELEPHONED MUJIB IN LONDON A COUPLE OF WEEKS AGO. HE HAD GOTTEN IMPRESSION THAT SEVERAL OTHER PERSONS WERE PRESENT WITH MUJIB AT THAT TIME, AND THAT MUJIB WAS—AT LAST IN PART—REITERATING PAST POSITIONS FOR THEIR BENEFIT. BHUTTO THEN RECALLED, ONCE AGAIN, SOLEMN PROMISE WHICH HE SAID MUJIB HAD MADE TO HIM BEFORE BEING FREED FROM DETENTION HERE LAST JANUARY, THAT THE TWO WOULD MEET AGAIN SHORTLY TO DISCUSS COMMON PROBLEMS. BUT ON THIS POINT, AS ON OTHERS, MUJIB HAD SHOWN THAT HE WAS NOT MUCH OF A STATESMAN. BHUTTO REMARKED THAT ALL HIS OTHER EFFORTS TO REACH MUJIB, INCLUDING CALLS ON HIM IN LONDON BY BALUCH LEADER AKBAR BUGTI, HAD DRAWN A BLANK.
5. I ASKED WHETHER THE DELAY IN HIS TIMETABLE IMPLIED ANY BASIC CHANGE IN BHUTTO’S STRATEGY FOR RECOGNIZING BD, NOTING THAT THIS ISSUE WAS APPARENTLY CRUCIAL TO FURTHER PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING SIMLA AGREEMENT WITH INDIA. BHUTTO SAID FIRMLY THAT HIS BASIC STRATEGY REMAINED SAME. HE WAS A REALIST AND PRAGMATIST, EVEN IF MUJIB WAS NOT. HE KNEW THAT GOP HAD, SOONER OR LATER, TO RECOGNIZE BD AND THAT DELAY HAD ITS COSTS ALTHOUGH HE ALSO COULD NOT AFFORD TO IGNORE DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. IN OCTOBER HE PLANNED TO GO TO THE PEOPLE AND LAUNCH A CAMPAIGN TO GET BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROBLEM THAT WOULD, IN EFFECT, PREPARE THE WAY FOR RECOGNITION OF BD. HE COULD NOT, HOWEVER, FIX A DATE WHEN HE WOULD SEE THE TIME RIPE TO PUT MATTER TO NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FOR APPROVAL. PROBLEM WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY SIMPLIFIED IF MUJIB COULD BE PERSUADED TO MODIFY HIS STAND ON MEETING BHUTTO. SOME FRIENDS (HE MENTIONED FRENCH AND INDONESIANS) HAD SUGGESTED POSSIBILITY OF ARRANGING MEETING AT WHICH GOP RECOGNITION OF BD WOULD BE ANNOUNCED WHEN THE TWO PRINCIPALS CAME TOGETHER. BHUTTO SAID HE WAS READY TO OFFER MUJIB THE PRESIDENCY OF REUNITED PAKISTAN, IF FOR NOTHING MORE THAN TO SHOW HIS OWN GOOD FAITH (AND ALSO, IT OCCURRED TO ME TO TRY TO ABSOLVE HIMSELF OF OPPOSITION CHARGES THAT HE HAD CONNIVED IN BREAKUP OF PAKISTAN SO THAT HE COULD BECOME PRESIDENT IN THE WEST.)
6. I ASKED TO WHAT EXTENT BHUTTO WAS LINKING IN HIS OWN MIND THE QUESTION OF BD RECOGNITION WITH THE RELEASE OF POWS AND THE PROPOSED WAR CRIMES TRIALS. BHUTTO SAID IT WOULD BE DISASTROUS TO HIM IF ALL THE POWS WERE NOT RELEASED AND IF TRIALS WERE BEGUN IN DACCA AFTER RECOGNITION OF BD. IF TRIALS WERE BEGUN IN THE INTERIM, IT WOULD BE GREAT SETBACK TO THE PROSPEcTS FOR RECOGNITION. BHUTTO REITERATED HIS OWN READINESS TO PUT ON TRIAL ANY PAK PERSONNEL CHARGED WITH CRIMES TN EAST PAKISTAN IN 1971. HE SAID HE HAD NO DESIRE TO PROTECT RAPISTS OR OTHERS OF THAT ILK.
7. NOTING IT WAS MOST DESIRABLE TO FIND SOME WAY TO BREAK THE CURRENT IMPASSE BETWEEN MUJIB AND BHUTTO,I ASKED BHUTTO HOW HIS DETENTION OF THE BENGALEES IN PAKISTAN FIGURED IN THE PICTURE. BHUTTO INTERJECTED THAT HE KNEW I HAD DISCUSSED THIS MATTER WITH SOME PAK OFFICIALS INCLUDING AIR MARSHAL CHAUDHRY ONLY LAST WEEK (ISLAMABAD A-140 SEPTEMBER 1, 1972 NOTAL). (THIS WAS THE FIRST I KNEW MY INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS THIS SUBJECT, EXPRESSING DOUBTS ABOUT THE WISDOM OF NOT ALLOWING THE BENGALEES TO DEPART, HAD COME TO BHUTTO’S ATTENTION.) BHUTTO SAID HE TOO WAS SYMPATHETIC TO HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS BEING FACED BY BENGALEES DETAINED HERE. THEY HAD BEEN CAUGHT UP IN A COMPLEX OF TROUBLES NOT TO BHUTTO’S LIKING (I.E., AS INNOCENT VICTIMS OF THE FAILURE OF INDIA/ BD TO RELEASE THE PAK POWS). HE SAID HE WAS LOOKING AT SOME POSSIBILITIES FOR ALLOWING SOME OF THE BENGALEES TO LEAVE PAKISTAN. HE AGREED WITH MY REMARK THAT WHATEVER HE COULD FIND IT POSSIBLE TO DO ALONG THAT LINE SHOULD TEND TO COUNTER THE VERY UNFAVORABLE IMAGE WHICH PAKISTAN HAD ACQUIRED IN MANY COUNTRIES DURING THE EVENTS OF 1971.
8. I ASKED IF BHUTTO COULD TELL ME HOW THE CHINESE VETO OF BD ADMISSION TO THE UN HAD COME ABOUT, SAYING I SURMISED THAT PEKING WOULD NOT HAVE APPLIED ITS FIRST VETO UNLESS IT WERE IN ACCORD WITH PEKING’S OWN ASSESSMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND INTERESTS. BHUTTO INDICATED THAT HE HAD HIMSELF TAKEN THE INITIATIVE ON THIS QUESTION. HE HAD SENT FONOFF SECGEN AZIZ AHMED TO PEKING IN JUNE (BEFORE SIMLA) TO TALK ABOUT CONTINGENCIES AND STRATEGY. AT THAT TIME, HE WAS STILL PLANNING 0N RECOGNITION OF BD IN AUGUST. BUT HE HAD INSTRUCTED AHMED ALSO TO EXPLORE AN ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY IN THE EVENT BHUTTO FELT UNABLE TO PROCEED WITH RECOGNITION. IN THAT CONNECTION THE POSSIBILITY OF A CHINESE VETO IN UNSC HAD BEEN DISCUSSED. SUBSEQUENTLY, AMB SHAHI HAD BEEN CALLED BACK FOR CONSULTATIONS AND THEN RETURNED TO PEKING FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON THE VETO. BHUTTO INTIMATED THAT THESE EFFORTS HAD BEEN OF IMPORTANCE AND THAT THE CHINESE VETO WAS A SIGN OF PEKING’S DESIRE TO HELP PAKISTAN AT A VERY CRITICAL TIME. IT WAS ALSO TAKEN IN RECOGNITION OF DAMAGE INCURRED BY PAKISTAN AS RESULT OF SOVIET INTRIGUES IN 1971. BHUTTO SAID HE THOUGHT PEKING WISHED TO ESTABLISH GOOD RELATIONS WITH BD BUT IT WAS WILLING TO WAIT. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUERY, BHUTTO REAFFIRMED THAT THE APPLICATION OF THE VETO WAS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH HIS OWN CONTINUING INTENTION TO PAVE THE WAY FOR ACCEPTANCE IN PAKISTAN OF THE REALITY OF BD. HE THOUGHT, HOWEVER, THAT PAK RECOGNITION OF BD WOULD PROBABLY NOT COME IN TIME FOR A REVERSAL OF THE CHINESE POSITION AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF BD INTO THE UN AT THIS YEAR’S SESSION OF UNGA.
9. I ASKED ABOUT RECENT VISIT HERE BY PRC VICE FONMIN CHIAO KUAN-HUA. BHUTTO DID NOT OFFER ANY DETAILS, COMMENTING MERELY THAT CHIAO HAD COME FOR A REVIEW OF ISSUES AT FORTHCOMING UNGA. (MFA DIRGEN FOR UN AFFAIRS HAS GIVEN SIMILAR EXPLANATION FOR CHIAO’S VISIT, WHICH ATTRACTED MUCH SPECULATION HERE BECAUSE IT CAME AT VERY SHORT NOTICE AND IN WAKE OF CHINESE VETO OF BD IN UNSC.)
10. SUBJECT OF INDO-PAK RELATIONS CROPPED UP AT VARIOUS TIMES DURING ABOVE DISCUSSION. BHUTTO SAID HE WAS DETERMINED TO MOVE AHEAD ON EFFORTS AT RAPPROCHEMENT IN WAKE OF SIMLA ACCORD. HE RECALLED THAT PRIMIN GANDHI HAD TAKEN PERSONAL DECISION, IN LAST MOMENTS AT SIMLA, TO BREAK DEADLOCK ON A FEW POINTS AND TO SIGN THE ACCORD WITH BHUTTO. BHUTTO ADMITTED THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO MRS. GANDHI OF HIS HOPES AND INTENTIONS ON RECOGNIZING BD IN AUGUST, AND THAT SHE COULD WELL HAVE BEEN DISAPPOINTED WHEN BHUTTO SUBSEQUENTLY FOUND HIMSELF UNABLE TO FOLLOW THROUGH. HE HAD SENT AZIZ AHMED BACK TO DELHI LAST MONTH TO EXPLAIN HOW EVENTS HAD OBLIGED BHUTTO TO SLOW DOWN ON RECOGNITION. HE THEN REITERATED HIS DEDICATION TO MOVING FROM CONFRONTATION TO A NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH INDIA.
11. BHUTTO SAID HE WAS SORRY THAT THE DEADLINE SET AT SIMLA FOR THE COMPLETION OF FORCE WITHDRAWALS TO EITHER SIDE OF THE INDO PAK BORDER HAD NOT BEEN MET. HE THOUGHT DELINEATION OF THE KASHMIR LINE OF CONTROL, WHICH THE INDIANS CONSIDERED AS PREREQUISITE TO WITHDRAWAL TO INTERNATIONAL BORDER, WOULD EVENTUALLY BE COMPLETED ALTHOUGH THE MILITARY NEGOTIATORS ON BOTH SIDES HAD TO BE GUIDED WITH A FIRM HAND. BHUTTO SAID HE WAS NOT SURE WHEN THE NEXT MEETING OF INDO-PAK OFFICIALS WOULD TAKE PLACE PURSUANT TO SIMLA ACCORD, BUT IT SURELY WOULD NOT BE BEFORE FORCE WITHDRAWALS WERE COMPLETED. PLANNING FOR THE NEXT MEETING WITH PRIMIN GANDHI WOULD THUS HAVE TO AWAIT FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS. BHUTTO SAID HE RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANCE WHICH GOI ATTACHES, IN THIS REGARD, TO QUESTION OF PAK RECOGNITION OF BD.

SOBER

THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Military Supply for Pakistan

The Pakistani Ambassador has asked if it would be possible to move a small amount of military equipment which belongs to Pakistan, but was caught up in the embargo when all military shipments to India and Pakistan were prohibited.

Background

You. will recall that you told Pakistani Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmed last spring that resumption, of military supply would create too sharp a reaction in the Congress, but that you would look at the whole military supply question after the November election, President Bhutto has since indicated his understanding of this position. Most recently he told Secretary Connally that he would not want to do anything that would embarrass you before the election, but that after November he would like an opportunity to make representations about Pakistan’s r e qui r e me nt s.

Against this background. Ambassador Sultan Khan has now asked for the release of about $1. 7 million of military equipment which was in the process of shipment out of the U. S. at the time when all arms shipments to South Asia were halted last winter. There was, of course, a larger amount of equipment licensed or on order at the time of the embargo, but these are the cases of special current concern to the Ambassador; (a) an assortment of spare parts for aircraft, tanks, weapons and electronic equipment worth about $935, 000 being held in a New-York warehouse at a monthly storage cost to the Pakistanis of $1, 500; (b) engines for Pakistani military aircraft (F-104, C-I30, B-57, helicopter) worth about $800, 000 and owned by Pakistan but here for overhaul.

There are also other inequities and financial hardships which American companies and the U. S. Government have had to bear as a result of the embargo, There is some $17.2 involved for U.S. manufacturers

and about $16 million for the U5G,

The Problem

There is no question about the fact that the $1.7 million worth of equipment in immediate question belongs to Pakistan and should be returned. Serious consideration should also be given to correcting the other inequities caused by the embargo, including commercial hardship eases. The only real issue and it is a very sensitive one — is when this should be done, both in terms of U.S. and Pakistani interests.

This problem of timing sterns from the fact that any adjustments right now in the embargo that would allow any military shipments to Pakistan would jeopardize the Aid Bill and could turn ourmilitary supply policy toward South Asia into a campaign issue. There is a movement in Congress led by Senator Church to include in the Aid Bill a prohibition against all military assistance to South Asia and it was included in the original Senate version. The Mouse version of the bill now under consideration does not, however, include this prohibition and we are hopeful about getting the Senate prohibition stricken. There is, of course, opposition and during the period between now and the passage of an aid bill any appearance that we are moving toward resumption of military assistance to Pakistan would, strengthen the hand of those who claim that the only way to stop the Administration is to include a prohibition against all military supply to South Asia.

The problem, therefore, is essentially one of tactics. The $1.7 million worth of equipment in question should in principle be released to Pakistan and could be now by simply issuing the necessary Munitions Control licenses,. It is not, however, in either the U. S. or Pakistani interest that this be done in a way that jeopardizes the Aid Bill. In short, it would be wiser to hold back on the release of this shipment awhile longer and thereby preserve our ability to not only clean up other inequities and commercial hardships but to consider revising our entire arms policy toward South Asia after the election.

Recomincndation: Hold up on this Pak request until after action on the Aid Bill is completed or until after the election, whichever is later At that time we can then take action to (1) release the $1. 7 million of equipment by issuing the necessary licenses and {2} resolve the issues of other existing inequities within the framework of an overall, review of our military sales-’fjolicy for South Asia.