The crisis in Bengal is almost certainly the most immediate of the dangers that face the world community. In following the fate of the millions of destitute refugees and recording the praiseworthy international efforts being made to help them, it is easy to forget that the underlying situation is changing dynamically all the time, and almost irreversibly. The current claims of the Bangla Desh guerrillas may be exaggerated. But the reports of the thousands being trained to join the fight in the months ahead seem solid enough.

The suffering in India and the reports of brutal repression in East Pakistan are natural recruiting sergeants, both for fighters and for organizers—of which Bengal has plenty. The situation is thus one in which fighting is in progress and mobilization is now gathering its own momentum. In Rawalpindi counter-measures by the generals are inevitable? At some point down the line, if nothing is done, India and Pakistan will find themselves at war, perhaps in spite of last-minute disengaging efforts when Delhi and Karachi find themselves in the slipstream.

It follows that an emergency has arisen which fits the clause in the United Nations charter which calls for Security Council action when international peace is threatened. The difficulties of admitting this fact (as opposed to proclaiming it when some minor country like
Rhodesia is out of favour with the world community) are undeniable. Somebody has to raise it in the Security Council, and its members are leaving the initiative to someone else, with a hopeful eye on Russia.

Yet in his statements on, the plight of the sufferers on both sides of the Indo-Pakistan frontier U Thant has by implication recognized that a disaster, and not a natural one, has to be averted. It seems all too likely that, given the personalities in control in Pakistan, and the growth of public feeling in India, when the situation becomes at once intolerable and inextricable, resort to arms may seem the simple solution. It follows that the sooner mediation of the formal United Nations type can be added to the pressures being applied by diplomacy, the better.

The key to some progress seems to be the frank recognition that President Yahya Khan’s position is difficult. It does not permit him to go quickly into reverse. Certainly his political handling of the crisis has been bad, and the Pakistan army's appalling record in suppressing the East Pakistanis, and in making this repression as much as possible a continent-wide communal matter, is the result. But the alternatives to President Yahya Khan are even worse because more warlike. He has already failed to find a civilian team to take over the government.

India needs to recognize these facts. It may be tempting for Mrs Gandhi, having wisely rebuffed her own hotheads, to listen to those who calculate that West Pakistan will collapse into powerlessness in time, and enable India to rearrange matters in Bengal in such a way as to resettle the refugees, create a Bangla Desh that will break Pakistan's unity but not India’s, and yet avoid the risks of war and outside interference. Any such calculations, which may be wrong in many ways, predicate more time than the situation gives to those who aspire to control it. Neither war nor anarchy on its borders suits India. But these are the most likely alternatives to negotiations over a political settlement, and there are no political negotiations without some compromises from the start.

The fact that Pakistan now seems more inclined to mediation and assistance through the United Nations seems to be enough for India to become cold, lest she lose some of her undoubted present moral advantage. Russia, which might have persuaded Delhi to take a longer view, seems to find Mr Nixon's approach to China a reason to be non cooperative. This is the worst way of internationalizing the Bengal problem, if all involved are set on squeezing the last ounce of temporary diplomatic advantage from the crisis before taking a responsible and constructive line, they will jostle each other over the precipice.