The treaty of peace and cooperation between India and Russia does not come wholly as a surprise. Both countries have been gravitating towards closer relations for ten years past and have lately had their lingering hesitations removed. In spite of Mrs Gandhi’s description of the treaty as one of non-aggression it has spikes in it: they are intended to be visible to those who might otherwise unthinkingly impale themselves upon them. Consultation over what either side regards as a threat may be a rather watered down version of defence treaties of the past, but very properly nowadays it is thought that war can be evaded if the threat of it is seen and acted upon.

The dangers that India and Russia want to guard against are limited and easily defined and the new alignment can be expected to tell where it is meant to tell. Of course this is not a matter of ideological alignment. When President Nixon and Chairman Mao can cross such boundaries to meet a need that each acknowledges, Moscow and New Delhi are as easily joined without risk of mutual political contamination.

At a time of increased tension between India and Pakistan the need for the treaty is obvious enough on India’s side. For Mrs Gandhi it is a card laid on the table in the unresolved clash over East Pakistan and it will make its point. But the effect of the treaty on a much wider span of international relations should not be overlooked. Arrangements of this kind are never altogether equal: no one expects Indian divisions will ever be mobilized in aid of the Red army. If the Russians think the commitment is worth while it must be because any doubts they had have been resolved.

The Sino-Soviet dispute bursting out in 1960, the Sino-lndian conflict of 1962, the attempted mediation after the India-Pakistan clash at Tashkent in 1965, the acute tension on the Sino-Soviet frontier in 1969 were events rounded off in Russian minds in 1971 by an election in India that spoke well of the country’s statility, then by the explosion in East Pakistan and the consequent tension between India and Pakistan; and finally by Mr Nixon’s intended visit to Peking. All these experiences pointed to straightforward conclusions, that China would not be a friend for a long time to come, that India was the major power in the region with whom the Russians could best work, and that Pakistan, broken-backed if not actually split into two by the catastrophic action against the Bengalis, was no longer to be carefully weighed in the balance against closer relations with India.

While such grounds for a Russian commitment have taken shape over the years the needs of the moment must have clinched the treaty and it is the effect of the treaty on the conflict in East Pakistan that matters. Hitherto Mrs Gandhi has resolutely resisted pressure from the opposition to press India's advantage against Pakistan by outright alignment with the Bangla Desh government or by incursion into East Pakistan territory on the excuse of repatriating refugees. One way of looking at the treaty might encourage greater risks in pursuing such ends. A weakened Pakistan is always a temptation to India. There are Indians who dream of a reversal so great that not only east but west Pakistan might be brought back into the unity that was severed in 1947.

It would be dangerous if Mrs Gandhi were now to take advantage of the assurance given by the treaty. By strengthening India in the long term the treaty will make any adventurous policy now the more foolish and the more provocative. Moreover the Russians saw how in 1965 China was prepared to use threats on behalf of Pakistan that would engender much greater risks if they were repealed in similar circumstances now. They do not want that situation repeated. Perhaps these risks are much less. Probably China is not in the mood to behave so abruptly as in 1965. But if these dangers are to be avoided the Indians will have to stick to the difficult course of restraint and allow time to evolve a solution for East Pakistan.