Obsession with war on the Indian sub-continent
If there is any immediate and tangible threat to world peace today it exists on the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent where two major, well equipped and disciplined armies are now closer to war than at any time since the 1965 conflict.

Nurtured by partition and exacerbated by the hostilities in 1965, the animosity between these two Asian neighbours has intensified alarmingly during the past six years. As a result, the acquisition of arms and the balance of military power has now become an overall obsession in the region.

With both India and Pakistan now devoting 50 per cent of their annual budgets to defence, the build up of arms has now reached dangerous proportions. During the past five years military hardware has poured into both countries from all corners of the globe-from China, Russia, the United States, France and Germany. Today, with both these large Asian forces armed to the teeth, the events in East Pakistan have brought emotion to boiling point. The two hostile neighbours could be thrown into war at any moment.

In terms of numerical strength, India’s armed services, now at a strength of nearly one million men, outnumber the Pakistani forces by three to one. But this advantage is offset by the fact that 10 of India's 27 divisions are mountain troops who would be tied down on the northern Sino-Jndian border in the event of a conflict.

After spending nearly £700m on defence every year during the past half decade, the strength of the Indian army has been raised to 820,000 men. They make up the following combat units: two armoured divisions. 13 infantry divisions, 10 mountain divisions, six infantry brigades, two parachute brigades and one independent armoured brigade.

The Indian armed services are well disciplined and on the whole both officers and the ranks have remained impervious to the political urges which have permeated other Indian institutions in recent years.

On the other hand the Army remains a heterogeneous force by virtue of the regional, ethnic and linguistic affiliations of the different units. This problem— as it has done in the past— continues to plague the morale of the Indian Army. For instance, a certain highly qualified officer might prove suitable for an important and crucial post but before taking a decision the Government has to weigh up the regional susceptibilities of the officers and men in the unit to which the candidate might be seconded.

In conditions where the average villagers' major ambition is to enlist their son in a relatively well paid and secure job in the Army, the question of conscription in India does not arise. There is always a long queue outside the recruiting offices.

The perks and conditions afforded to Indian soldiers are perhaps better than those in any other sphere of life and in this sense the morale of the Indian armed forces remains high.

In terms of service conditions and emoluments, the well disciplined and efficient Pakistani soldier is, perhaps, more pampered than his Indian counterpart. However, the political events which have forced the troops to repress their own people in East Bengal this year must have certainly shaken the otherwise high morale of the compact Pakistani Army.

Almost all of the fighting units and men recruited in East Bengal, such as the East Bengal Regiment and the para military East Pakistan Rifles, have defected to the rebels and are now locked in a bitter battle against their erstwhile West Pakistani comrades. Nearly five of Pakistan's 14 seasoned divisions have been committed to police work and quashing the rebellion in the eastern wing. This means that only nine divisions can now be spared to defend the crucial western front and Kashmir.

At the same time, the long drawn out communications route around India to the eastern wing has turned into a logistical nightmare which is relentlessly eating into the Army’s budget and into the economy of the country itself.

Simultaneously the confidence of the Pakistani Army must have been somewhat shaken five weeks ago when India formally joined the Soviet block after entering into a defence pact with Moscow. President Yahya Khan of Pakistan is well aware that if any single event has altered the military balance of power on the subcontinent in recent years then it would certainly be the ratification of the Indo-Soviet Treaty in August this year.

Euphemistically entitled “The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation”, the pact obliges both India and the Soviet Union to come to tach other's assistance in the event of an act of aggression by a third country. Under these circumstances Pakistan can no longer be certain that China, her major ally and umbrella against the larger Indian Army, would risk a conflict with the Soviet Union on the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent simply to pull President Yahya Khan's chestnuts out of the fire.

In other words, in the event of an Indo-Pakistan war, the Chinese are less likely to create diversionary incidents on the Sino-Indian border to tie down a large section of the Indian Army on its northern front, as happened in the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war.

As against the 27 Indian divisions (of which 10 are permanently in the Himalayas), Pakistan maintains 14 divisions, a small Navy and a highly trained and efficient Air Force at an annual cost of £522m (54.3 per cent of the annual budget).

The Army consists of 12 infantry divisions, two armoured divisions and one armoured brigade. In addition, it is estimated that President Yahya Kiran is presently raising by conscription another one and a half divisions to meet the crisis in East Pakistan.

With these two well equipped Asian armies already on the verge of war, one must examine the factors which would trigger off a conflagration on the subcontinent. It is now doubtful whether India, restrained by the Russians, would march into East Bengal because of the continuing influx of refugees. A war in East Bengal would leave the province in chaos and, even if the West Pakistanis were pushed out, India might find herself with an extra 70 million mouths to feed.

The war, if it comes, will probably be sparked off because of other factors. If the East Bengali guerrillas, operating and assisted from Indian bases, begin to harass the Pakistanis effectively, President Yahya Khan might be forced to initiate a military action—most likely in Kashmir—with two objectives in mind. First, to focus the world's attention to the struggle in Kashmir and secondly, action in Kashmir would certainly force the UN Security Council to meet and, at the ensuing ceasefire negotiations, President Yahya would demand a package deal: peace in Kashmir provided that India assures the world she will no longer assist the Bengali guerrillas.
Peter Hazelhurst