Rawalpindi, Nov 9
On a traffic sign on the outskirts of Islamabad, a Pakistani patriot has provided his own cheerful variant of the familiar “Crush India” slogan by scrawling “India crushed”, The confidence reflects the belief of the more zealous Punjabis and perhaps of the middle ranking officers in the Army that Pakistan would be the winner.

President Yahya Khan apparently thinks otherwise. There is increasing evidence that he and his entourage of senior officers believe that in a new war Pakistan could be dealt a crippling blow. They are now anxious to allay any war fever.

The President himself has said that to take India on would be “military lunacy”. Of late, the Government-supervised press has been playing up the size of India's strength and maintaining that Pakistan is outnumbered at sea by seven to one, on land by five to one and in the air by three to one—shortly to be increased to five to one as India takes delivery of new Russian MiGs.

Significantly in a country where foreign newspapers are virtually banned, the Pakistan Times published on Sunday the text of the President's recent interview with Newsweek which contains probably the most realistic (and most depressing) assessment of Pakistan's military position he has publicly made.

Censorship on news from the eastern wing was partially lifted about a fortnight ago and since then West Pakistanis have also read of a gloomy round of bomb attacks, sabotage and political assassinations for which claims of mukti bahini troops (guerrillas) killed do not compensate.

The economic cost of holding down East Bengal is now being felt in people’s daily lives in terms both of rapidly rising prices and unemployment. Enough soldiers have been lost for the campaign to have made a human impact in villages and cities.

At the same time, doubts can be heard, in private at least, on whether the severity of the Army's action in March was justified. These are accompanied by a sense of the bitterness and of hatred that has been created in the eastern wing for the west. Belligerence is slowly being eroded both by self-questioning and economic hardship.

Diplomatically as well, the cards are dropping from President Yahya’s hand. From Mr Bhutto's mission to China, Pakistan has obtained diplomatic and verbal support together, apparently, with new arms deliveries but not the assurances she needs to face up to India.

To add to this, the United Stales has cancelled licences for $3m (£1.2m) worth of arms. The volume may not be significant but the action as evidence of President Yahya’s growing international isolation.

In this situation, Pakistan's predominant fear is that India might try to carve out a slice of East Pakistan for “Bangla Desh”. If this should happen there would be a surge of opinion here, perhaps irresistible, demanding that Pakistan strike back in the west. “Our Strength is here in the west”, the President has said.

The most obvious and the most tempting objective for Pakistan would be Kashmir. To control it, Pakistan must first bottle up the Indian troops there by either capturing the two approach roads from Basoli to Udhampur and from Pathankot to Jammu, or, less plausibly, by seizing the high pass north of Udhampur.

If they chose to concentrate on the Basoli-Pathankot sector, the Pakistanis would have little alternative but to smash their way in by a massive armoured and air attack.

In the west, the two sides are more evenly matched with both sides maintaining about 13 divisions. Pakistan's disadvantage is that it is weaker in the air both in numbers and in quality of aircraft.

Such an attack would be a desperate gamble, especially since the Indians have recently reinforced their positions on the approach roads. It is possible that the Pakistanis may feel driven to it if their grip on East Pakistan continues to crumble at the present pace and their pride is doubly hit by the humiliation of the Army and the break up of a unitary Pakistan. The decision to open up a western front would than be presented as a response to continuing aggression in the east.

Most observers here think that an accidental escalation is unlikely on the grounds thru both sides have accustomed themselves to a continuing round of border incidents. For the attack to have any chance of success the Pakistanis, on the Israeli model, would have to act swiftly, seize what they wanted and hope that the great powers would soon impose a ceasefire. From a position of strength they could then negotiate with India over new frontiers.

In such a war Pakistan would have to expect an Indian counterattack on Lahore—which it might be able to resist as Lahore is now heavily defended—and an Indian drive southwards to cut off Karachi.

The longer the war continued the more Pakistan would feel its shortages of supplies and spare parts. Whatever the outcome in the west, the probability is that the eastern wing would be lost.

The war fever here two weeks ago bears no comparison to the hysteria of 1965. To some extent it was a response to a real fear that India would seize the opportunity of a crisis in Pakistan to attack. But it also suited President Yahya's book as the greater the alarms the more chance of the great powers putting a restraining hand on Mrs Gandhi.

His efforts are now directed towards countering the effects of her tour of Western Europe and the United States. Sultan Muhammad Khan, the Foreign Secretary, leaves tomorrow for a similar round of visits in order to acquaint western leaders of “the serious threat to Pakistan's security of the mounting escalation by India”.