Nation

After the arbitrary suppression of the East Pakistan rebellion in 1968-69, a resurgence of nationalist sentiment in that Bengali section of the two-part country became inevitable. As I predicted then ( See Ahmad: 'Law & Order' in Pakistan," The Nation, April 14, 1969), by imposing martial law the ruling military regime was merely buying time; the rebellion would go underground for a couple of years, only to emerge again prepared to fight for the highest stakes. All of that has now come to pass. The best informed correspondents estimate that the genocidal tactics of the West Pakistani army have cost Bengal close to half a million lives. Indian sources, up to now the only sources available, - claim that already approximately 3 million refugees have crossed the border, and that thousands more come over each day.

Meanwhile, the movement that started as no more than agitation for autonomy has grown into a struggle for full liberation. Nor is this a Biafra type of minority insurrection, East Pakistan, though the smaller land area, contains the majority of the population - 75 million - and these no longer wish to remain in the same state with the rest of the people of Pakistan (they are separated from them, in any case, by 1,000 miles of India.) The creation of an independent country, Bangla Desh, has for them become both necessary and inevitable.

In West Pakistan, on the other hand, the economy approaches total collapse. With its foreign exchange reserves falling well below $200 million, Pakistan owes almost $5 billion to its many sponsors. The war in Bengal is costing something like $2 million a day and the disruption of economic life in East Bengal has cut Pakistan's capacity to earn foreign exchange in half.

The government has petitioned its Western supporters to advance another $1 billion to enable the country to stay afloat, perhaps for a year. But even if this additional aid were forthcoming, and one doubts that it would be unless formidable strings were attached, it would again be a matter of buying time. As a state, Pakistan is in an irreversible decline, its progressive disintegration caused by the military-bureaucratic character of the ruling groups. Unless, however, a responsible and humane international policy can be formulated and enforced within the next couple of months, the drift of present events will lead to one of the worst Asian tragedies in even this most blood-ridden of centuries.

East Bengal and West Pakistan are estranged from each other by vast differences of geography, language and culture, and the relationship between the two has fallen into the classic colonial pattern: West Pakistan dominates the military and the bureaucracy. East Bengal accounts for less than 16 per cent of the civil service and less than 10 per cent of the army; at the higher levels of military officialdom, it has no representation at all, and that in itself is decisive in a military state such as Pakistan.

In addition, however, all the significant industrial and commercial concerns are governed from West Pakistan; Bengal controls, if anything, the subsidiaries. West Pakistan converts Bengali resources to its own profit. According to the official Planning Commission, $2.6 billion worth of Bengali resources were transferred to West Pakistan between 1948-49 and 1968-69. In the same period, according to the same sources, East Bengal produced 50 to 70 per cent of the exports, but received only 25 to 30 per cent of the imports. That this disparity has accelerated during the military government's tenure is also documented by the Planning Commission: in 1959-60, per capita income in West Pakistan was 32 per cent higher than in Bengal; ten years later, this inequality had increased to 61 per cent. The effect of economic exploitation on the development of human resources was also drastic. Between 1947 and 1967, Bengal's percentage of the total student enrollment fell from 80 to 61 for the primary schools, from 53 to 40 for the secondary, from 60 to 49 for the general college and from 70 to 45 for the general university level.

These statistics are mere samples; similar ones could be provided in such other areas as housing, medicine, industrial output, relative price indexes, etc. Thus, starting off in 1947 as the dominant province, with higher educational levels and greater capacity to earn foreign exchange. East Bengal had been reduced by the late 1960s to a semicolonial status wherein it served as the producer of raw materials for West Pakistan to process and sell, and as a consumer of surplus West Pakistani goods.

It should be kept in mind as well that West Pakistani ruling groups have built their wealth and power at the expense not only of Bengal but also of vast areas of West Pakistan itself. Accordingly, nationalist movements exist within West Pakistan, notably in Baluchistan and in the northwestern home of the Pathans. So, by attempting to suppress the revolutionary struggle in East Bengal, the army acts in the economic interest of the rulers in West Pakistan and at the same time serves a warning on militant groups within West Pakistan.

The relationship between Bengal and West Pakistan has eroded only gradually. Between 1947 and 1958, while the country was still ruled by a succession of civilian coalitions and Bengal enjoyed parity, at least on the parliamentary level, Bengali disaffection was kept in check by the illusion that the disparity in developmental investments and professional recruitment would somehow be repaired. Political means had not yet been fully exhausted, nor were the civil service and the army yet seen as the only powerful groups in the country. However, the failure of the feudal politicians to create representative institutions of some permanence and to solve the central problem of parity between the two provinces placed an extraordinary concentration of power in the hands of the bureaucrats, and the civil service became the first prominent power elite in the country .

During the same period, the introduction of American arms aid threw the entire political culture of Pakistan off balance. Coupled with a fear of neighboring India that had already been entrenched as a national paranoia, the availability of weapons led quickly to a thorough militarization of all facets of national life. Then, in 1958, the army took over directly. Given the almost negligible representation of Bengal in the military and the civil services, Bengali leaders watched the rise of the military-bureaucratic state with great apprehension: the imposition of martial law excluded Bengal from all significant levels of decision-making power. In the preceding parliamentary decade Bengali leaders had been demanding only parity between the regions - which was, considering Bengal's numerical majority and its superior capability to earn foreign exchange, generous almost to a fault. Now, they began to talk more and more of provincial autonomy. They still hoped that some kind of loose federal structure, giving each section of the country substantive control over its own resources and planning, could resolve the inter-provincial impasse. However, a situation in which Bengal would control its own resources was defined in West Pakistan as secession and a threat to the national interest. The demand was rejected out of hand.

Meanwhile, thanks in part to the way American aid was dispensed, the country's economy took on a monopolistic structure reminiscent of Latin America. By 1968, when the army had been ruling for less than ten years, twenty West Pakistani families controlled 97 per cent of the country's insurance, 80 per cent of the banking and 66 per cent of the industry. Thus, not only was Bengal reduced to semi-colonial status but West Pakistan itself was gripped by a small, cohesive, incredibly powerful group of exploiters. And the army was consuming 60 per cent of the national budget, which meant that, despite a genuine scarcity of capital resources, most of Pakistan's money was unavailable for productive investment.

Then, in the closing months of 1968, uprisings occurred on university campuses and were supported by workers and the lower bourgeoisie. In East Pakistan, the rebels rallied to the six-point program of Sheikh Mujib-ur- Rehman's Awami League, which was a declaration of Bengali aspirations for autonomy. In West Pakistan, where the Bengali demands were thought seditious, agitation was organized around questions of university reforms, higher salaries for professionals, and the liberal freedoms of press assembly, etc. There were thus two parallel and simultaneous rebellions, that in the West being of reformist character, whereas the Bengalis in the East were demanding a radical revaluation of the national questions itself. However, neither region was prepared for armed struggle, and when the army moved in, resistance evaporated and order was restored, at least on the surface.

Nevertheless, the events of 1968-69 set the basic political character of Pakistan for the years immediately ahead. First of all, the fact that Ayub Khan had to abdicate was a limited victory for the rebellion. Secondly General Yahya took over with full knowledge that prolonged army rule would be disastrous and was obliged to promise general elections. Thirdly, the dominant political power in both regions became evident: Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman in Bengal and in West Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, former Foreign Minister and leader of the People's Party, were now clearly unbeatable. Finally, it was evident that the politics. even the politicians, of the two regions, were irreconcilable Mujib and Bhutto had nothing but contempt for each other.

That the elections did take place in Pakistan, that they were not rigged, that within the scope of the electoral possibilities offered them the people were allowed to exercise free and remarkably well-defined choices - all of that reflects not so much the good will of the ruling Junta as the intensity and continuity of public pressure. Sheikh Mujib's Awami League contested elections for the National Assembly on the single issue of regional autonomy and captured all but two of the seats reserved for Bengal, which gave the Party a clear majority in the Assembly. In West Pakistan, Bhutto's People's Party also won a comfortable majority. However, the fact that each region was represented by a party that did not contest seats in the other province was further indication of the country's polarization, The two parties were not so much opposed to each other as exclusive of each other, and no common interest joined the regions into a single nation.

Because of its hold on the Assembly Mujib's Awami League was in a position to frame a constitution guaranteeing regional autonomy. Before the elections, however, the ruling Junta had issued a "Legal Framework Ordinance" which made it mandatory that the forthcoming constitution preserve the "integrity" and "unity" of Pakistan. In context, "integrity" simply meant retaining the status quo. Effective power was still with the army, which was determined to keep things as they were, whereas the elections had given a clear majority to a party specifically pledged to make basic changes. The result was a deadlock.

The elections were completed by mid-December, and a session of the National Assembly was scheduled for March 3, 1971. On February 15, however, Bhutto, knowing that he had only half as many seats as did Mujib, and therefore no power to determine the character of the constitution, announced, in extraordinary defiance of the mandate given by the Bengali people, that unless Mujib was prepared to compromise in advance on the issue of autonomy, the People's Party would boycott the session. General Yahya quickly postponed the session and declared a crisis. The sensible course would have been to let Bhutto carry out his threat, while the majority party went ahead with the urgent business of forming a government. But Bhutto was in cahoots with the army, and East Bengali nationalists had no choice but to mount a strike that was tantamount to civil disobedience.

Consequently, all effective administration of this province of 75 million people passed into the hands of the Awami League even the provincial Chief Justice refused to administer the oath of office to the new army-appointed Governor. So, after a charade of talks that fooled no one, but which gave time for a troop buildup Yahya ordered the army to take over East Bengal, and ousted all foreign Journalists so that the precise details of what was to happen would be hard to determine. The blood-ridden orgy, the homelessness of millions, the hunger and disease of many more millions, the lack of relief and the consequent horrors - all that is well known and need not be repeated here.

Nationalism is obviously the most important issue in Bengal today. However it has been used to build a mass movement primarily of the urban bourgeoisie, who thus far have not been able to compete with the West Pakistani ruling groups on the terms set by the latter. This bourgeoisie has received active support from the urban working classes, who are often employed by West Pakistani bosses and know themselves to be exploited. The peasant masses, however are not directly abused by West Pakistanis but are, on the contrary, sharply aware of exploitation by indigenous entrepreneurs. For the peasant, therefore, the issue is not independence, or even autonomy but social revolution in the countryside. Because there is no effective Socialist movement, the peasant vote has gone along with that of the urban bourgeoisie. But that class, led by the Awami League, has embraced nationalism purely as a way to Bengali control over Bengal's resources - which given the programs and leadership of the League, means replacing West Pakistan ruling groups with the aspiring urban classes of Bengal. A true emancipation of the peasantry is not on the League's agenda.

Consequently, the Bengali leaders, who must have anticipated the West Pakistani response to the cry for autonomy, did not prepare the peasantry to resist. The masses were used to lend electoral legitimacy to the programs of the urban leaders, but they were not given in return the means to defend themselves against the genocidal tactics of the army. Thus, while excusing in no way the behavior of the West Pakistani ruling classes, one must question the wisdom, even the motives, of the Awami League.

Its leadership had no illusions about the army or the excesses to which it would resort. Under the circumstances, it had a choice between arming the masses or bending to the will of the army just enough to avoid massacre. To have done neither, to have flung an unarmed populace into a predictable inferno was unforgivable. The illusion was kept up that an autonomous East Bengal, even an independent Bangla Desh could be acquired through negotiations and electoral politics, and without the direct, militant participation of the people. The unpleasant probability is that the peasantry was never prepared for an armed struggle, precisely because to give it that role would have profoundly changed the character of the movement and committed East Bengal to a social revolution in the countryside, instead of mere autonomy with increased leeway for the Bengali middle classes.

The United States, which is not otherwise known for its support of liberation struggles, has been sympathetic to the drive for autonomy, and this benevolence may be related to the national-bourgeois character of the Awami League leadership, as well as to American interests in that area of the world. The twin monopolies over industrial capital and military hardware that give West Pakistan domination in Bengal are the direct results of American aid. During the 1950s, West Pakistan played a significant role in the encirclement of the Soviet Union (it was from Peshawar, an American base in northwest Pakistan, that the notorious U-2 took off. ) America developed interest in East Bengal only during the 1960s, concurrent with the detente with the Soviet Union, the growing American involvement in Indian military affairs subsequent to the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962, and the expansion of America's war in Southeast Asia. This interest is obviously stimulated by East Bengal's proximity to China, Southeast Asia and, of course, India.

Pakistan's foreign policy is largely determined by its ongoing territorial feuds with India. So, when American military aid was made available to India at the time of the Sino-Indian conflict, Pakistan retaliated by developing some ties with China - despite the fact that American aid kept flowing into Pakistan as well: it now adds up to almost $5 billion. When, a little later, the United States held itself aloof from the Indo-Pakistani conflict of 1965, suspending military aid to both countries, Pakistan began accepting arms from China.

Soon thereafter, the Awami League announced its six- point program. Washington, quite satisfied with the Awami League leadership, let it be known that the more autonomous East Bengal became, the easier it would be for the United States to assist it on separate and more favorable terms. Now that the Nixon Administration has made unmistakable its determination that the United States will continue to be a dominating force in Vietnam, the Americans must be well aware that a friendly, independent Bangla Desh could provide bases from which to bomb or at least intimidate China. From some such calculations, American diplomats have been rather benign toward the Awami League leadership. However, with 65 billion sunk in West Pakistan and the relationship with the West Pakistani capitalist class still flourishing, the United States cannot take a clear-cut pro-Bengali position. One must therefore expect that the United States will continue the ambiguous policy it has been maintaining.

The Chinese, who supported the "unity" of Pakistan and warned against foreign interference, seemed to be taking a preemptive position, one that was perhaps determined largely by the U.S. interest in East Bengal. At the time, the struggle for Bangla Desh was led by pro- American groups and there was a real possibility that India, if not America directly, would intervene. The Chinese position was designed, or so it seems, to forestall a pro-Western intervention, and to let the contradiction between the West Pakistani ruling groups and the socially advanced classes of Bengal be resolved through a massacre of the Bengali leadership, producing a revolutionary situation (in Maoist terms) in which the eventual confrontation would be between an occupation army and the progressively armed masses. Then, in the course of a protracted struggle, the leadership of the movement would pass from the urban elite to the peasant guerrillas.

If that interpretation of Chinese motivation is correct - and I cannot be certain that it is - it would seem likely that the position is tentative and subject to change as the character of the struggle changes. Inasmuch as it ignores the sufferings of the Bengalis and does not condemn the brutality of West Pakistani troops, China's attitude is reprehensible; it can be understood, however, within the context of Maoist ideology and the threat the Chinese feel from any disturbance to the balance of power on the subcontinent.

The ongoing problem is as follows: East Bengal has been exploited and brutalized by the ruling groups of West Pakistan. The question of nationalism is therefore altogether valid. However, it is not at all likely that autonomy, or even the creation of an independent Bengali state, could begin to cope with the hunger, the misery, the oppression of the deeply injured Bengalis. One is far from convinced that the urban, middle-class Awami League, now outlawed and gone for the most part underground, can exert the force necessary to achieve not only political independence but a genuine social revolution in the countryside.

So far, the Bengali peasantry has not emerged as a genuinely revolutionary class, in the sense of being conscious of its distinct interests and developing both the leadership and the programs to realize their fulfillment. For the moment, however, the terror practiced by the West Pakistani troops has forced a revolutionary potential upon this peasantry. It is likely that the alienation of the rural Bengali is now absolute and that, for a relatively short time, he may be imbued with a will for armed struggle. The same genocidal troop tactics have bestowed a revolutionary aura upon the banished leadership of the Awami League.

It is possible, therefore, that the revolutionary peasant mass may accept the League as a revolutionary vanguard. In that case, we may yet see the peasantry fighting for essentially urban, middle-class goals. It can even happen that a Bengali state will be created by the efforts and sacrifices of the peasantry - who will then be ruled by a socially advanced, urban middle class. The question is not whether a Bengali state should come into being; it must. The question is, what sort of state?

Within East Bengal, the cry of secession was first raised by Maulana Bhashani, the perennial peasant leader who, after the tidal wave hit Bengal and the West Pakistani rulers failed to provide even the semblance of adequate relief, demanded independence in November 1970 almost four months before the more moderate leaders of the Awami League got around to escalating their demand beyond autonomy. The factionalism of the Bengali Left, and the superior organization of the Awami League, made it possible for Mujib to steal Bhutanis thunder. In addition, Bhashani made the mistake of boycotting the elections, instead of using them as a sort of referendum on the independence issue. This error gave the Awami League a near consensus and thus an unchallengeable electoral legitimacy.

Now that electoral politics have proved a disaster, Bhashani is likely to regain prestige. He will then surely point out that the elections should never have been taken seriously, that from the start the struggle should have been a peasant fight for independence and social revolution in the countryside. Bhashani is almost 90, but still amazingly well. The more radical elements within the Awami League, restrained in the past by the moderate politics of Mujib, are also likely to gather more force and following.

Meanwhile, refugee camps in India, overcrowded with poor, angry peasants, will probably become recruitment centers for a liberation army. As the Bengalis shift from electoral illusions to armed struggle, the composition of the leadership is bound to change drastically. There is already fervent talk of launching guerrilla warfare, but it is unlikely that a strong, coherent, well-trained guerrilla movement capable of effectively confronting West Pakistan's army can arise soon. If it is launched too hurriedly, it can only provoke a new massacre and deepened despair in the Bengali masses.

Some of the Bengali problems may be solved by the bankruptcy and chaos within West Pakistan itself. In the short run, however, the army is likely to step aside in favor of a quisling administration that will have the appearance of civilian rule. With this arrangement made, West Pakistan will probably get enough financing to stave off disintegration. In that case, Bengal will either have to give up its aspirations for independence or prepare for a long struggle.

If the civilian leadership of West Pakistan had had the wisdom to support the drive for Bengal's autonomy and to condemn the army's brutal enterprise, some bridges might still have remained between the two parts of the country. Instead, Bhutto, the self-professed leftist, blessed the army for "doing its duty" to preserve unity "in the name of the country and the Almighty." Bhutto was a loyal servant of Ayub for seven years; he is a feudal landlord with formidable connections among the industrialists. Since entering civilian politics, he has picked up the slogan of "Islamic socialism" (when pressed to define this "socialism" more concretely, he is known to have cited Britain's Wilson and Germany's Brandt as his models) . At one point, it looked as though he would be a well-meaning, aristocratic left winger of a Fabian sort, a kind of Nehru. Instead, he has demonstrated a fondness for military solutions and some tendencies toward National Socialism. Under his leadership, West Pakistani civilian politics have drifted as far away from even an understanding of Bengali aspirations as the army has been from the start.

The question of immediate relief is paramount. With 3 million refugees in India and with West Pakistani administrators completely unable to do relief work in a hostile Bengal, it is absurd to evade the problem as an internal affair of Pakistan. A bold and quick intervention by the United Nations is vital. Within East Pakistan, the problem could be solved simply by lifting the ban on the Awami League, suspending army rule, installing government by the legitimate representatives of the people - which is to say an Awami League administration - and letting international agencies do independent relief work without any West Pakistani interference. I doubt if the West Pakistani ruling class can rise to such plain good sense. It will, instead, perpetuate its own rule and let the Bengalis die of hunger and disease. In the process, it will also administer the liquidation of Pakistan as a state. Bengali alienation is already of such a degree that Pakistan seems to be geographical fiction. Thanks to the greed of the West Pakistani military-bureaucratic establishment, the powerless people of Bengal have no choice but to inherit their own earth. The movement for Bangla Desh now seems irreversible.