Karachi. Pakistan’s foreign policy, so long, based on alignment with the West, then followed by Ayub’s “bilateralism” that included friendship with China, now lies in ruin. The country is close to being a State without a foreign policy. This is implicitly admitted by the regime and General Yahya Khan has not found it necessary to appoint a Foreign Minister in his cabinet. Foreign relations for the moment are being conducted on an ad hoc basis by the General himself with the permanent head of the Foreign Office in Islamabad always at his side.

Yahya Khan appears to be more concerned with keeping all options open for the elected Government that may take office after the elections than with giving the country a new sense of direction and purpose in foreign relations. This is in contrast to his domestic policy, where he is ignoring protests and going ahead with preparing, approving, and launching the fourth Five-Year Plan.

The regime’s difficulty in foreign relations remains that for far too long Pakistan’s policy had been based on the simple assumption that Kashmir can and must be liberated. But after the 1965 war and the Tashkent declaration it became obvious that India’s determination and ability to hold Kashmir was greater than Pakistan’s capability to liberate it. What is more, the army and the Civil Service as well as the elite, has discovered that the cost of the commitment to liberate Kashmir is too high and intolerable. Yet no one in Pakistan has the strength or the stature to tell the people so. The result is that the former Foreign Minister, Mr. Bhutto, is having a field day feeding the people’s old prejudices, denouncing the Tashkent declaration, and posing as the architect of Pakistan’s China policy. Under this onslaught from Bhutto most politicians are finding it necessary to keep renewing their commitment to liberate Kashmir.

HOSTILITY

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the Awami League leader of East Pakistan, is the only politician who hardly ever mentions Kashmir, but he never fails to mention the Farakka Barrage being built over the Ganges in India that would “turn East Pakistan into a desert”. He does, however, not invoke hostility towards India; he invokes hostility towards West Pakistan by saying that it is the Government in Islamabad that has allowed India to build the barrage. He does not say how this Government could stop India building a barrage within India’s territory. This means that the very conflicts with India that once united East and West Pakistan now divide them.

In this situation, President Nixon’s recent statement that his administration would work for closer economic cooperation between India and Pakistan is being read here to mean that the United States would encourage the emergence of a confederation between Pakistan, India and Kashmir as a bulwark against China. It is not unusual for a Great Power to have such long-term objectives in an area of vital interest, but Mr. Nixon’s words have added to the regime’s domestic difficulties. The result is that the Shah of Iran’s recently concluded state visit to Pakistan is being presented by Maoist propagandist here as a mission to persuade Yahya Khan to cooperate with the American strategy in the area.

The moment the Shah left Pakistan, there arrived a Chinese friendship delegation led by Mr. Kuo Mo-jo, vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of China. Overnight, the Shah’s stern figure has been replaced with the gentle, beaming, almost fatherly figure of Mr. Kuo Mo-jo on the front pages of Pakistani newspapers. Mr. Kuo Mo-jo has been promising support for the liberation of Kashmir (not even the Moslem Shah promised as much), has been getting thanked for China’s support in the 1965 war, has been delivering fraternal greetings from Chairman Mao to the people of Pakistan, and has promised an early visit to Pakistan by Mr. Chou En-lai, the Chinese Premier.

Where, one asks, is Russia in all this? “With the imperialists of course,” says the Maoist. He may well be right in thinking that both the US and the Soviet Union would like Pakistan and India to get together and mobilise their resources for development. In any case, all the great Powers except China, are tired of India-Pakistan conflicts. Faced with such internal and external pressures, the most Yahya Khan can do is to hold the fort, hoping that some day, somehow, somebody will tell the people the stark facts. But choosing the devil himself for an ally is a change that is not yet in sight.