Economist

The independence of East Pakistan is inevitable. What started as a movement for economic autonomy within the framework of a united Pakistan has been irrevocably transferred by the wholesale slaughter of East Pakistani civilians into a movement that sooner or later will produce an independent East Pakistan — “Bangla Desh” is a matter of time. A complete discussion of the Pakistan question would include an analysis of cultural, linguistic and social issues, which, along with economic and politics, are at the heart of the present conflict. This paper has a more limited goal: to assess the economic and political bases of disaffection in East Pakistan and to suggest the likely implications for international relations of the break up of Pakistan.

In brief, the fact of a large and widening gap in the average standard of living between the two regions of the country is incontestable. Even the West Pakistan dominated Government admits that the average East Pakistan must not do with barely two-thirds average income in the West, and he faces higher prices too. The East Pakistanis argue that income disparity is largely the result of a systematic subordination of the interests of the Eastern region to those of the West; specially, the East Pakistanis charge that allocation of foreign-exchange — both that earned by the export of East Pakistani jute and that provided by foreign aid — disproportionately favours West Pakistan; that allocation of domestic investment reinforces the income disparity; and that high tariffs and import quota prices to East Pakistanis in order to provide profits and jobs in West Pakistan.

We believe that in the main the facts support these charges. Pakistan Government policies have, at the very least, excerpted the inequalities that arise from an uneven distribution of natural resources between the two regions, and a disproportionate shares of the benefits of economic development have accrued to West Pakistan.

The political programme of Sheikh Mujib’s Awami League, overwhelmingly endorsed by the people of East Pakistan in the recent elections, sought to correct these disparities by transferring control over economic policy from the Central Government to the provinces. The response of the Yahya Khan’s Government has been to unleash a reign of terror whose full dimensions are only gradually becoming known.

The West Pakistani Army can delay independence, but terrain and logistics coupled with the implacable hostility of the East Pakistanis to what has become foreign domination, are on the side of “Bangla Desh”. Apart from the elementary and overwhelmingly humanitarian interest in an end to further bloodshed, American interest lies with a quick rather than a slow realisation of independence. Most important, tension in South Asia will be reduced. Bangla Desh and India will develop mutually advantageous economic and cultural relations, a move long desired by both sides but frustrated by West Pakistanis who have refused to countenance any normalisation of relations in the East as long as the Kashmir issue remains outstanding. The Kashmir issue, too, is likely to subside in importance, not because of any reduction in tension in the West — the Kashmir issue has never aroused much interest in "the East but because West Pakistan, without the economic support of the East, will be unable to sustain the level of pressure it has been able to mount until now. In short, Bangla Desh will be a truly independent state, ready and able to maintain normal relations with its neighbours and the powerful nations of both block, but a satellite or pawn of no one.

The independence of Bangla Desh will be inimical to American interests only in so far as American aid is used to delay the inevitable. Economic aid to the Pakistan Government should be immediately suspended. The "one-time" exception made last year to the embargo of arms sales and military aid (imposed after the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965) should be rescinded. American arms must not be supplied to a Government that makes war on helpless civilians.

U.S. ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO PAKISTAN

Since 1951 Pakistan has been a major recipient of U.S.. economic aid amounting to approximately 3 billion by 1969- Except for food aid donated under Public Law 480, the bulk of this assistance has been used to support industrialisation in West Pakistan, with only a handful of projects undertaken in East Pakistan.

The quantum of U.S. military aid to Pakistan is a classified figure but two estimates put it between $1.5 to $2 billion for the period between 1954 and 1965. The assistance has included F-104 Starfighters, Patton tanks, armoured personnel carriers, automatic and recoilless infantry weapons. This impressive array of modern weaponry was given expressly for defensive purposes. With Pakistan an early member of SEATO and CENTO this military aid was intended to bolster the armed containment of the Communist Block in the Dulles era of U.S. foreign policy but apart from the brief border war with India of 1965 the only active use of these- sophisticated weapons has occurred against the unarmed and defenseless civilians of East Pakistan.

The growth and maintenance of the superstructure of the armed forces which was built up with massive U.S. military aid continued even after 1965 when the United States decided to put an embargo on the delivery of arms to both Pakistan and India. This was made possible by diverting resources from the much-needed development projects. East Pakistan poorer and less powerful politically than the West, suffered more by this irrational policy.

Suprisingly, the United States has just recently (October 1970) made an exception to its embargo on military sales to. Pakistan. According to the information available, the United. States has offered to supply Pakistan the following items:

(a) Armoured personnel carriers (approx. 300)

(b) Maritime reconnaissance Aircraft (4)

(c) F-104 Jet fighters (6)

(d) B-57 bombers (7).


Fortunately, no sales or deliveries have yet been made. It is not too late to rescind the offer, a move that would be of practical as well as symbolic value.

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DOMINATION OF EAST AND WEST.

The basic facts seem to support the East Pakistan charge of economic domination by the West. The economic disparities between East and West Pakistan have been so serious for so long that the Pakistan Government’s highest planning authority has been forced to take official note of them.

A recent report by a panel of experts to the Planning Commission of the Government of Pakistan provides authoritative documentation of the widening of economic disparities in the two regions. The most striking fact in this report is the widening gap between the income of the average West Pakistani and his Eastern counterpart. In 1959-60, the per capita income in West Pakistan was 32% higher than in the East. Over the next ten years annual rate of growth of in¬come of West Pakistan was 6.2% while it was on 4.2% in East Pakistan. As a result, by 1969-70 the per capita income of the' West was 61% higher than in the East. Thus in ten years the income gap doubled in percentage terms, it increased even more in absolute terms.


East Pakistanis blame three instruments of central government policy for their plight:

1. Pakistan’s scant investible resources, plus foreign aid, are directed unduly to the development of West Pakistan to the comparative neglect of East Pakistan.

2. In particular, East Pakistan’s foreign trade earnings are diverted to finance imports for West Pakistan.


3. Economic policy favours West Pakistan at the expense of the East. Specially, tariffs, import controls, and industrial licensing compel East Pakistan to purchase commodities from West Pakistan which, but for the controls, they could obtain more cheaply in world markets.

We believe the East Pakistani claims to be largely justified. First, it is indisputable that the bulk of public investment has been in West Pakistan though the majority of the population lies in the East. With 60% of the population, East Pakistan’s share of central government development expenditure has been as low as 20% during 1950/51—1954/55 attaining a peak of 36% during the Third Five Year Plan period 1965/66—1969/70. East Pakistan has received an even smaller share of private investment, less than 25%.

It may be true, as defenders of Pakistan government policy claim, that the great bulk of worthwhile investment opportunities have been in the West, though the relative attractiveness of the West may be more the effect of overall government policy than a cause. In any event the fact remains that investments in the West have done little or nothing for the people in the East.

As for the second point, it is clear that foreign exchange has been allocated to the detriment of East Pakistan. Over the last two decades East Pakistan’s share, of total Pakistan export earnings has varied between 50% and 70% while its share of imports has been in the range of 25% to 30%. Until 1962—63 East Pakistan has shown significant surpluses on foreign account, which has changed in recent years to small deficits. By contrast the West’s foreign trade has shown a substantial and chronic deficit that has absorbed virtually all foreign exchange made available through foreign aid.

With respect to the third point, general economic policy has clearly favoured West Pakistan. The West’s preponderant share of imports and investments might have provided inexpensive necessities for all of Pakistan’s people. In fact, it has allowed the development of inefficient industries, which, ironically, have prospered largely because of tariffs and quotas that have made East Pakistan a captive market. 40% of all exports of West Pakistan are sold to East Pakistan; in 1968- 69 the West sold 50% more to the East than it bought from the East.

An analysis of foreign trade data reveals that a net trans¬fer of resources has taken place from East to West Pakistan. According to the official report referred to above, East Pakistan has transferred approximately $2.6 billion to West Pakistan over the period 1948-49 to 1968-69.

In short, Pakistan’s economic policies are harmful to East Pakistan. "Exploitation" may be a strong word, but it seems clear, all in all, that East Pakistan’s economic interest have been subordinated to those of the West, and that the East Pakistanis have had good cause to resent that fact.

The economic domination of East Pakistan has been facilitated by West Pakistani dominance of the Central Government. The military regime of Pakistan has existed, with modifications, since 1958, and decision-making authority rests with a well-entrenched civil service and their military bosses. All senior military members of the administration have been West Pakistani in 1960, and the proportion has not changed much since. The Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission and the Central Finance Minister, key individuals in resource allocation, have always been West Pakistanis.

The location of the Central government in West Pakistan has encouraged the concentration of industry and the entrepreneurial class in West Pakistan. Such a concentration is to be expected in an economic system where direct allocational control of resources by the government makes direct access to government authorities a prime business asset.

BACKGROUND TO THE BREAKUP OF PAKISTAN

The history of economic and political domination of East Pakistan by the West led naturally to increasing demands for provincial autonomy spearheaded by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s Awami League. Its 6-point platform for autonomy sought to transfer control over foreign trade, foreign aid allocation and. taxation, powers to the provinces so that no province could be dominated through disproportionate control of central government’s powers over resource allocation.

At the polls last December this Awami League platform swept 167 of the 169 seats in the National Constituent Assembly that were allotted to East Pakistan. The Awami League’s 167 seats constituted an absolute majority in a chamber of 313. The political and military powers of West Pakistan tried to pressure Sheikh Mujib into compromising on his 6-point autonomy mandate. In particular Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, leader of the West Pakistani People’s Party which had won 80 odd seats in the elections, demanded that control of trade and aid should remain with the Central Government. When Sheikh Mujib refused to compromise on these instruments of past economic domination, Bhutto announced a boycott of the Constituent Assembly scheduled to meet on March 3. General Yahya Khan used this pretext to postpone the Assembly indefinitely. This arbitrary postponement provoked demonstrations in Dacca and other cities on March 3, which the military decided to control by force. The military authorities conceded 172 deaths in the disturbances (the Dacca correspondent of the London Observer put the figure nearer 2000). Despite this bloody provocation the Awami League refrained from declaring independence. Instead they launched a campaign of civil disobedience to demand a return of troops to barracks and an enquiry into the firings. The campaign of non-cooperation effectively transferred civilian authority to Sheikh Mujib, but even in the massive rally of March 7 Sheikh Mujib still spoke of a united Pakistan with autonomy for each province. His preparedness for negotiation and commitment to the unity of Pakistan was demonstrated by his continuation of talks for the next two weeks despite the well advertised influx of West Pakistani troops. Indeed, in retrospect it would appear that the West Pakistani officials were never negotiating in good faith; negotiations were a way to forestall an open break until sufficient numbers of West Pakistani troops could be brought on the scene to unleash a terror whose full dimensions are only now becoming known. The Awami League's commitment to a peaceful political settlement was convincingly demonstrated by the complete lack of preparation of the civilian population to the onslaught of military arms which was unleashed on them on the night of Thursday March 25.

INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATION OF AN INDEPENDENT “BANGLA DESH”

From news reports now available it would appear that the use of massive military fire-power has broken the Awami League and its supporters in most urban centres. But control of urban centres at gunpoint in a country where 90% of the population lives in rural areas hardly constitutes a framework for any effective government, let alone a popular one. The immediate prospect is for ruthless military rule in urban centres, with tenuous control over a country-side which is likely to become increasingly the base for armed guerrilla resistance.

The place for such a movement clearly exists. The overwhelming support for the Awami League’s demand for autonomy was clearly shown in the election results of December when 167 out of 169 seats allotted to East Pakistan were won by the League. As reports of military massacres are carried by urban refugees to the rural areas, the democratically expressed sentiment for autonomy is likely to be converted to a militant desire for independence. It is possible that a West Pakistani army of occupation can suppress the Bengali nation for two months, six months or a year, but the American experience in Vietnam illustrates only too painfully the impossibility of holding an entire population captive by force of alien arms alone.

The emergence of an independent Bangla Desh appears to be inevitable in the long run. What remains in question is how much blood will flow before it occurs. Politically it is clear that the longer it takes to achieve independence, the more likely it is that control of the independence movement will slip away from the moderate leadership of the Awami League to the more leftist National Awami Party (which did not contest the December elections).

Assuming that the independence movement succeeds while Awami League control, certain predictions may be made about its relations with neighbours and super-powers. As expressed in public statements of Sheikh Mujib, an independent Bangla Desh will establish friendly relations with India and set up economic trade to their mutual advantage. Upto now such trade and all cultural ties have been frustrated by the West Pakistanis who dominate the Central Government. They believe that short of war, their only lever to force a settlement of their Kashmir claim is the economic interest of India in trade with East Pakistan. By contrast, East Pakistan has never been aroused by Kashmir and in the 1965 war no military activity took place within its borders. Strong linguistic and cultural ties with the state of West Bengal in India are likely to help cement durable good relations between the two countries and reduce tension in the area. Unable to share the burden of military expenditures with the East, West Pakistan is bound to tone down its policy of confrontation with India, a confrontation which, for the past 24 years, has diverted scarce resources of both these poor populous countries from much needed economic development to defence.

As an independent nation Bangla Desh might conceivably establish marginal economic contracts with Communist China. But these are unlikely to be any greater than the current scale of trade and aid between China and Pakistan, and will certainly be less than the likely range and depth of East Bengal’s economic ties to neighbouring India. As long as India is the main trading partner (and both pronouncements of Awami League leaders and the economic geography of the region support this possibility), it is unlikely the Bangla Desh will become a satellite of Communist China.

The USSR has, in the past three years, become an active patron of the military clique that controls Pakistan. Soviet aid has included considerable economic aid (including agreements for a steel mill in West Pakistan) and some military aid. The Soviet initiative has been largely a response to growing Communist Chinese ties with Pakistan. This competition between rival giants has rebounded to the benefit of West Pakistan where the central government and military establishment are based. The USSR has not been sensitive to the aspirations of East Pakistanis in the past, and is unlikely to make a new Bangla Desh an arena for superpower competition for influence.

A major goal of U.S. foreign policy in this area has been the reduction of the debilitating confrontation between India and Pakistan. This goal will surely be advanced by the existence of an independent Bangla Desh friendly to India. Most observers believe that the Awami League leadership will follow neutral foreign policy, particulary where the U.S. and multilateral aid agencies like the World Bank are the major aid donors.

Bengali independence will be inimical to American interests only if by following short-sighted policies we drive East Pakistan into the arms of another power—the USSR or China. To the extent that Bengali independence is delayed by means of American arms, the image of the United States will suffer, and rightly so. The offer of arms to Pakistan by the United States Government in October 1970, whatever its ostensible purpose, will do more harm than good when a Pakistani military machine is making war on its own citizens. The United States Government must rescind this offer forthwith. No further military aid, or economic aid, which directly or indirectly provides foreign exchange that makes it possible to buy weapons abroad, should be given to West Pakistan until it withdraws its occupation force from East Bengal and recognises the independence of the Bengali nation.