Delhi, Friday. All the action in Pakistan is concentrated in the east, and that is where everyone’s eyes are fixed. But no one doubts that if a full- scale war does break out it will be decided in the west, and in particular on the huge plains on the Punjab. That is where the last great battles took place and where both sides have now massed the bulk of their forces. It is unlikely that the campaign will be one of the more memorable military episodes for the strategies. Last time, frankly, it was a shambles on both sides and, though there are better weapons and much more elaborate defensive systems than in 1965, there is not much reason to think that the overall picture would be all that different now. But the world will have to get to know the obscure geography of Kashmir and the Punjab if it is to make any sense of the action.

Generations of filmgoers have become used to the idea that wars consist of great sweeping actions across magnificent countryside, with the head-on clash of opposing armies and wave after wave of reinforcements. It really is not like that. My illusions were shattered in the first war I covered when I spent a ludicrous day chasing around trying to find it. When I eventually got there - and it was sheer luck - it seemed to be a scrappy, rather pointless exchange of gunfire with everyone apparently content to sit where they were.

Whatever impression may be given in the maps of campaigns which everyone is so fond of the boldly directed arrows are strictly representational. The reality on the ground is that what each side is after is bring things like roads, railways, bridges, and little hummocks. If past form is any guide, one of the big thrusts from either side in an Indo-Pakistan war will come in the area of Lahore and Amritsar. The frontier runs about midway between the two cities, which are about 30 miles apart. Both are major communications centres and of great strategic as well as psychological importance.

They are linked by the great trunk road, the major highway which connects the two opposing capitals, Rawalpindi and Delhi. Last time both armies got thoroughly bogged down in this sector. The major feature here is the Ichhogil Canal, which the Pakistanis have constructed along 70 miles of the border. There is no question that its primary purpose is defensive.

The border here rubs in a north-south line and the canal follows it faithfully. It is 15 feet deep and 40 yards wide, with the western bank notably higher than the eastern. All along its length it has pillboxes, gun emplacements, and bunkers, and is thus a formidable obstacles to tanks. Since the 1965 war the Pakistanis have constructed two further anti-tank ditches between the canal and the border. The direct crossing point is the bridge at Dograi and the Indians managed to hold this briefly last time, though the village is heavily fortified with concrete pillboxes and tunnel complexes. But they had only got a few men across the Ichhogil when the bridge was recaptured. There is another bridge farther north, at Dera Baba Nanak, which allows access across the river Ravi and would allow any attacking army to cut the rail link between Lahore and Sialkot. In 1965 the Indians never really managed to breach this defensive line.

On the Indian side, to the east of Sialkot, the town of Pathankot is of considerable importance. The Pakistan border meanders in a great bulge here and the Indian town is within easy striking distance. It is a major road junction and the railhead from which India would reinforce and supply its forces in Kashmir. Its loss would effectively isolate the northern army particularly if there was a similar advance on Jammu. With the snow now lying heavily in Kashmir, it is hard to know just how much campaigning there might be in that area compared with last time. A major objective for both sides there is the 11,000 ft. Haji Pir Pass, which lies between Uri and Poonch. This is on the direct route between Rawalpindi and Srinagar and would allow either city to be threatened by whoever holds it. It is also a favourable route for Kashmiri irregulars from the Pakistan side to get down into the Indian part of the province.

Since 1965 there has been a lot of work done by both countries to mend their fences and put themselves in a better position. Indian radar cover has been greatly improved and the Pakistanis have built a new bridge to the south of Lahore which would allow them to mount a rapid flanking attack against any force advancing on the city. The last campaign suffered, in the strictly military sense, in that no one seemed terribly clear what they were fighting to achieve. It is unlikely that this fault will be repeated. The Indians, certainly, will go all out to crush the Pakistani army, and will doubtless draw an appropriately fierce response.

On the face of it, the Indians look set to win. They have a far bigger army and air force and the Pakistanis will be bogged down in the east. But there is no certainty that it will be a walk-over, particularly if India repeats the mistakes of last time. Though its Centurion tanks were used much more effectively than the Pakistanis Pattons at an individual level, they were poorly deployed and not backed up well enough with infantry. The Indians managed to get about three shells fired to every Pakistani shot - mainly because poor training in the electronics of the Patton gummed up the Pakistani crews - but they gained little ground.

Then there are the inevitable idiocies of any campaign. Because of the similarity of the two armies’ equipment in 1965 neither the ground forces nor the air crews were always sure who was who on the ground, and sometimes hesitated fatally. Communications were abysmal and there were air strikes at positions long since vacated by the enemy. There were even language problems. One unit ordered to take a village called Pindi Bhago thought it was being told to withdraw (“Bhago” in Hindi) and promptly did so. But the primary problem in the opinion of detached military experts will be that of logistics. Last time both sides had pretty well fought themselves to a standstill after three days though they were still estimated to have the material capacity to carry on for ten days on the Pakistan side and 20 on the Indian. The organizational ability to keep up full-scale war just not there, and there is a strong feeling that this has still not been resolved. The aftermath of the last campaign revealed considerable organizational confusion and doubling or even trebling of command. That may yet be the best hope of peace.