If President Yahya Khan was waving palm fronds at the Indians in his speech calling for better relation between the two countries he seems to have achieved little more here than to create a chill wind. There has been no official reaction - ironically the Indians celebrate the same Moslem festival as the Pakistanis - but there is no reason to doubt that the Government will react in much the same way as the cocktail parties and bazaars of Delhi. The speech is seen here as directed at the world at large and at the West Pakistanis, calculated to demonstrate that Yahya has done everything humanly possible to resolve the tensions and if war comes will have been forced into it. His call for the return of the 10 million refugees in West Bengal “who left their homes and hearths in a moment of fear and panic,” is regarded with near amazement, and so is his plea for Indian cooperation in the resettlement.

Delhi stick firmly to its view that the problem of East Pakistan is an internal matter for Pakistan and that Yahya is simply trying to get himself off the hook by internalising it. In its simplest form the argument is that the restoration of normality in the East, with the consequent reassurance for the refugees that they can return to their homes, will resolve that part of the crisis which most affects India. But it all hangs entirely on action in Islamabad. The Right wing, or some bits of it, positively want a war. This is partly to avenge the atrocities on Hindus, which get wide coverage in the newspapers here and are impossible to assess objectively. It is also to get rid of the menace of Pakistan : once and for all by supporting the establishment of Bangladesh as an independent nation and mortally crippling Pakistan’s military and economic position.

It has the attraction of all simplistic solution to complex problems, but is a minority view. The more thoughtful Indians accept that the problem of Bangladesh is inseparable from that of Kashmir, and that India has little to gain from action on the Eastern front. It is generally accepted that the military aspect of the East Pakistan problem offers few difficulties - though there is some scepticism about the more rose-tinted army assessments of the speed with which the campaign would be completed. But an eastern campaign would inevitably be followed by a Pakistani counter-attack in the West, which for all practical purposes means Kashmir. None doubts that, as in 1965, this would swiftly bring in the United Nations and the big powers, who have no appetite at all for monkey business in this highly sensitive strategic area.

One possible aspect of any subsequent negotiated settlement could well be a call for a referendum in East Bengal to determine its future status. And that, without question, would be followed very smartly by a Pakistani call for a referendum in Kashmir. Just as the Awami League’s election victory in East Bengal and its aftermath leaves little doubt about the outcome of any vote there, so the 90 per cent Moslem population in the Valley of Kashmir makes any discussion of a Kashmir referendum pretty academic. The main question is what attitude the Chinese would adopt and to what extent they would be prepared to huff and puff on India’s northern border to draw pressure away from the Pakistan forces in the West.

Some diplomatic observers think the Chinese have now written Yahya off as a loser and are simply letting him down gently, and this is to some degree supported by such indications as Chou En-lai’s response to Mrs. Gandhi’s message of congratulation on China’s accession to the U. N. There are also suspicions that the Chinese have started moving closer to the Bangladesh ‘Government” in Calcutta and that gift packages are arriving for the Mukti Bahini forces operating against the Pakistan army in the East. The Indians are not enthusiastic about the possibility. The solidarity of the Awami League is breaking down in exile and a division is appearing between those who want to face West and those more inclined towards Peking. Given the obstinate regionalism of the Bengalis and the plethora of Left-wing groups in West Bengal, Delhi is far from happy at the possibility of a Maoist-oriented regime in Bangladesh and the repercussions it might have in its own volatile part of Bengal.

Its foremost concern is to unload the refugees. The attempt to scatter them more widely has not been much of a success; Bengalis are not very keen to leave Bengal. The chances of inducing the eight million Hindus among them to go back look slim at best, and would certainly not be enhanced by the emergence of another authoritarian regime in the East. Nor, if it comes to that, is time on Mrs. Gandhi’s side, since the longer they have to establish themselves in India the less chance there is of their return.