CAIRO — The India‐Pakistan war came as a political blow to Egypt. It is not simply distressing that fighting should erupt between Cairo's special nonaligned friend and another Moslem land. But the conflict also seemed to damage Egypt's tactic to regain control of the Sinai Peninsula from Israeli occupation.

There had been signs that President Anwar el‐Sadat was seeking a peaceful solution despite his tough speeches, his alert to Egyptian forces and the imposition of a gloomy dimout in Cairo. To start with, he committed himself to search for an interim solution at indirect talks in New York's Waldorf Astoria Hotel. Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco was to have served as messenger from Egyptian to Israeli suites and back.

Mr. Sadat knew his Foreign Minister, Mahmoud Riad, opposed any interim solution. He feared a temporary truce line might evolve into a permanent frontier as was the case 23 years, ago after the first Arab‐Israeli war. So the President bypassed his Foreign Ministry to maintain contact with Washington.

When he was not personally involved in direct talks with Secretary Rogers or direct correspondence with President Nixon he used Mohammed Hassanein Heikal, brilliant editor of Al Ahram and his close friend, to act as official channel. Then, this autumn, he appointed his “own Kissinger,” Hafez Ismail, to take over the task.

Things had proceeded sufficiently in October for Mr. Sadat to name his chief negotiator for the proposed New York talks. This was Murad Ghaleb, former Ambassador to Moscow and now Number Two in the Foreign Ministry. But after eight weeks of waiting and many Washington promises, Israel produced no counterpart to Ghaleb.

The Israelis demanded more Phantom jets from the United States and also made it clear they disliked the Oct. 4 speech by Rogers to the U.N. Assembly, a speech whose skeleton was to serve as the basis for the Waldorf talks. This insisted on continuing the present informal cease‐fire and ultimate implementation of the 1967 U. N. resolution on Palestine. The prospect of further contacts faded.

At this point it is evident tub Egyptians planned to focus maximum world attention on the Middle East crisis during the scheduled autumn meeting of the U.N. Mr. Sadat had appeared to paint himself into a corner by declaring 1971 the critical year of decision, taking military precautions and hinting he might launch an attack.

The hope, apparently, was that the U. N. would be faced with another and even more frightening Middle East crisis and that, to avoid the fear of war conceivably involving the superpowers, it would summon international action. But here the India‐Pakistan war exploded—and with it the carefully arranged scheme to exert new diplomatic pressures by means of jingo talk and cautionary interviews.

The South Asian war attracted world attention so intently to the Indian subcontinent that every other crisis seemed relatively minor. Moreover, it fractured previous diplomatic fronts. It became embarrassing for Egypt to try and choose between neutralist India and coreligionist Pakistan when the former invaded the latter. And while the United States desperately sought a cease‐fire and troop pullback, the Soviet Union vetoed the idea—although it had been the greatest champion of such a formula in the Middle East four years ago.

The result is obvious gloom here. There is no enthusiasm for the idea of war but there is clamor for the return of Egyptian territory. There is tacit embarrassment about the Soviet position but ill‐concealed anger at what is held to be the lack of sufficient U. S. pressure on Israel.

Nevertheless, an imminent new round of fighting seems unlikely. President Sadat himself told me there were no Soviet forces in the Suez Canal area so they clearly couldn't help a crossing. The President also indicated that Israel still has a decided military edge.

The Arab world is in disarray. And Egypt implies its own peaceable predilections because it is just concluding a deal to have a West European consortium build a pipeline from Suez to Alexandria.

Talk and theatrics seem more warlike than reality in the Middle East right now. This has become more obviously true with the outbreak of the South Asian conflict. With Indochina continuing, one new war at a time is certainly the most this world can bear without blowing itself up.